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I. INTRODUCTION
The American criminal justice system is on trial. A chorus of
commentators-often but not exclusively in the legal academy-has
leveled a sharp indictment of criminal process in our country. The
* Judge Wilkinson serves on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
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indictment charges that large flaws infect nearly every stage of the
adjudicatory process. And the prescriptions are equally far-reaching,
with calls for abolition of many current practices and an overhaul of
the entire system. What is more, the critics issue their condemnations
essentially as givens, often claiming that all reasonable people could
not help but agree that fair treatment of the accused has been fatally
compromised. For these critics, "We live in a time of sharply
decreasing faith in the criminal justice system."'
As a judge with faith in that system, I am dismayed by the
relentless insistence that we have it all wrong. Of course the system,
like all human institutions, has its share of flaws. But the attacks
have overshadowed what is good about the system and crowded out
more measured calls for reform. The critics claim that major aspects
of American criminal justice work to the detriment of defendants,
when actually the reverse is often true. It is time for a more balanced
view of our criminal process, which in fact gets a lot of things right.
A brief word as to the scope of this Essay. I have focused
mainly on the adjudicatory process and on the criminal trial. I have
not sought to explore police investigatory procedure on the one hand,
or issues of detention and incarceration on the other, except insofar as
they bear on the adjudicatory process in some way. They are vast
topics in themselves, and the terrain I have covered is large enough.
My own reaction to the critics is one of gratitude for their
contributions but dismay that they have allowed the pursuit of
perfection in criminal justice to become the enemy of the good. Much
about American criminal justice is indeed good. The system provides
considerable protections for the accused and sets proper limits on the
brutality and deceit that human beings can inflict upon each other.
Simply put, in calling for an overhaul of our criminal law and
procedure, the critics have failed to appreciate the careful balance our
criminal justice system strikes between competing rights and values.
They have failed to respect the benefits of the system's front-end
features-namely, early process and early resolution. Moreover, they
have sold short the democratic virtues of our system. The sensible
tradeoffs reflected in American criminal justice are worthy of respect,
and the system's democratic tilt is deserving of praise. The critics have
extended neither. Ultimately, the often harsh tone of their indictment
has done an injustice to the system of criminal justice itself.
1. Harvey A. Silverglate, The -Tyranny of Good Intentions: How Prosecutors and
Bureaucrats Are Trampling the Constitution in the Name of Justice, 20 CATO J. 291, 292 (2000)
(book review).
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II. THE INDICTMENT
It is an article of faith among the legal intelligentsia that
criminal justice is almost a contradiction in terms. The indictment of
our criminal justice system contains a staggering number of charges,
and attempting to catalogue them all would be impractical and
tiresome. Instead, I offer a brief sketch of the prevailing portrayal of
our system. It is a dark picture indeed.
At the heart of the indictment is the charge that our
procedures fail to achieve the most basic task of a just system-the
protection of the innocent from a fate that should be reserved only for
the guilty. The accusers have used specific examples of wrongful
conviction to advance the belief that our entire system is fatally
flawed. Organizations like the Innocence Project claim that well over
20,000 Americans could be in jail for crimes they did not commit.2 In
response, the Innocence Project aims to 'leverage the power of these
remarkable stories to bring about fundamental improvement in our
deeply flawed criminal justice system."3 It claims to have "steadily
convinced the nation that innocent lives are being destroyed by a
system that must be fixed."4 Not content with particularized
prescriptions for improvement, the organization argues that the
system "must be completely overhauled."5
Prominent academics similarly transform individual instances
of exoneration into ammunition for wide-scale attacks. Beginning with
Edwin M. Borchard's 1932 study,6 scholars have written numerous
articles reporting instances of wrongful conviction and concluding that
the criminal justice system is broken.7 One scholar, for instance,
claims that mistaken convictions "will continue to happen with some
regularity" and asserts that "most miscarriages of justice in capital
cases never come to light."" Other critics similarly conclude that
2. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO SCH. OF LAW, YESHIVA UNIV., THE INNOCENCE PROJECT ANNUAL
REPORT 7 (2010), available at http://perma.cc/X5ZH-54RB.
3. Id. at 3.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: SIxTY-FIVE ACTUAL ERRORS OF
cRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 (1932).
7. See, e.g., Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We
Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1321 (1997) (arguing that "America's
criminal justice system creates a significant risk that innocent people will be systematically
convicted").
8. Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common in
Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469, 472, 497 (1996).
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exonerations "have challenged the traditional assumption that the
criminal justice system does all it can to accurately determine guilt,
and that erroneous conviction of the innocent is, as the Supreme Court
has assumed, 'extremely rare.' "9 Likewise, a review of a recent study
of DNA exonerations declares that "the wrongful convictions were not
idiosyncratic but resulted from a series of flawed practices that the
courts rely on every day, namely, false and coerced confessions,
questionable eyewitness procedures, invalid forensic testimony and
corrupt statements by jailhouse informers."o Commentators have
praised this study, calling it "a gripping contribution to the literature
of injustice, along with a galvanizing call for reform.""
The critics also charge that unjust outcomes are a product of
shortchanging the accused at every turn.12 The principal culprit is the
contemporary Supreme Court, which supposedly has eviscerated the
panoply of rights available to criminal defendants. Indeed,
commentators have accused the Court of "encourag[ing] police
practices that have gutted Miranda's safeguards,"13 nearly
"abandon[ing]" the exclusionary rule,14 and creating a body of Fourth
Amendment case law that protects only "middle-class homeowners." 5
In a similar vein, many critics believe that our criminal justice
system fails to provide effective legal representation to indigent
defendants, as the Sixth Amendment requires. As one scholar puts it,
"No constitutional right is celebrated so much in the abstract and
observed so little in reality as the right to counsel."16 The American
Bar Association likewise declares that "indigent defense in the United
9. Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIs. L. REV. 291, 291-92.
10. Jeffrey Rosen, The Wrongful Conviction as Way of Life, http://perma.cc/4MB4-5ULK
(nytimes.com, archived Mar. 12, 2014) (reviewing BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE
INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS Go WRONG 1 (2011)).
11. Id.
12. See Silverglate, supra note 1, at 291 ("A tyranny of law has replaced the citizen's
protection of law . . . .").
13. Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1519, 1521 (2008).
14. Stephen J. Schulhofer et al., American Policing at a Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies
and the Procedural Justice Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335, 361 (2011).
15. See William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1265, 1287 (1999) (arguing that Supreme Court case law leads to better protection for
middle-class rights than those of the poor in the context of search and seizure).
16. Stephen B. Bright, Gideon's Reality: After Four Decades, Where Are We?, 18 CRIM. JUST.
5, 5 (2003).
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States remains in a state of crisis."17 Like-minded critics point to
disparities in funding, such as the claim that indigent defendants
"receive only an eighth of the resources per case available to
prosecutors."1 8 Others paint a bleak picture of a criminal defense bar
"where advocacy is rare and defense investigation virtually
nonexistent," and where "individualized scrutiny is replaced by the
indifferent mass-processing of interchangeable defendants." 9 "[A]ll too
often, there are long delays before those accused of crimes are
provided lawyers, and the lawyers appointed have excessive caseloads,
do not have the investigative and expert assistance essential to defend
a case, or lack the skill, knowledge, and inclination to provide
competent representation."20 And some claim that the only possible
justification for the current system is either a naive faith in the virtue
of public defenders or a cynical assumption "that almost all indigent
defendants are guilty."21
Rather than ameliorating this sorry state of affairs, the
Supreme Court has allegedly made the problem worse through its
demanding standard for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims under
Strickland v. Washington.22 According to one critic, "[n]o one believes"
that Strickland "improves the trial process beyond a few rare cases of
error."2 3 Instead, it has resulted in "a lesser standard for judging the
competence of lawyers in a capital case than the standard for
malpractice for doctors, accountants, and architects." 24  And by
accepting "the status quo as 'effective,' [Strickland] creates no
17. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEF., AM. BAR AsS'N, GIDEON'S BROKEN
PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE, at v (2004), available at
http://perma.cc/8FSU-FS23.
18. DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 123 (2004).
19. David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1762 (1993);
see also David Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1688 (2009) ("[P]ublic
defenders and other court-appointed counsel . . . are so chronically and drastically underfunded
that there is strong reason to doubt the vigor and effectiveness of the advocacy they can provide,
in plea bargaining or at trial.").
20. Stephen B. Bright, Legal Representation for the Poor: Can Society Afford This Much
Injustice?, 75 Mo. L. REV. 683, 703 (2012).
21. Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense: Promoting
Effective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of Choice for All Criminal
Defendants, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 122 (1993).
22. 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
23. Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex Ante Parity
Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 308 (1997).
24. Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime
but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1858 (1994).
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incentive for states to improve on existing standards of legal
representation for the poor."2 5
Under this view, the high bar for ineffective-assistance claims
is but one example of the purportedly larger failure of appellate and
collateral review to correct the grievous mistakes made at trial. The
application of the harmless error doctrine allegedly shows that "judges
are unwilling" to "respect the rights of criminal defendants whom they
believe to be guilty,"26 and the Court's habeas jurisprudence promises
to "stifle the development of due process and criminal process rights
well into the future."27 Several advocates go as far as to charge that
postconviction review "unacceptably hinder[s] claims of innocence."28
The story gets worse. In stark contrast to the plight of
defendants stands the unbridled power of the prosecutor. The notion
that "[n]o government official in America has as much unreviewable
power and discretion as the prosecutor"29 is a source of acute
discomfort for the critics. They decry prosecutorial discretion as
"unchecked by law and ... barely checked by politics,"30 "stand[ing] in
sharp tension with the separation of powers," 31 and "inconsistent with
the most fundamental principles of our system of justice."32 Instead of
monitoring this power, legislators have enhanced it by providing a
broad menu of crimes that prosecutors can selectively enforce. 33 The
profusion of criminal law has served to empower both prosecutors and
police, "who can pick and choose among the multiple and overlapping
related offenses that may apply."34 Moreover, the Sentencing Reform
Act was a "decades-long enterprise provid[ing] prosecutors with
25. David Cole, Gideon v. Wainwright and Strickland v. Washington: Broken Promises, in
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 101, 114 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006).
26. Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, but Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal
Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1195 (1995).
27. Barry Friedman, Habeas and Hubris, 45 VAND. L. REV. 797, 800-01 (1992).
28. Philip G. Cormier et al., Federal Habeas Corpus & Actual Innocence, NAT'L L.J., May
16, 2011, at 34.
29. Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 959, 960 (2009).
30. William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV.
781, 840 (2006).
31. Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989,
1044 (2006).
32. James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1554
(1981).
33. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 509-10 (2001) (positing several theories for why the scope of criminal codes continues to
broaden).
34. Paul H. Robinson et al., The Modern Irrationalities of American Criminal Codes: An
Empirical Study of Offense Grading, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 709, 712 (2010).
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indecent power relative to both defendants and judges, in large part
because of prosecutors' ability to threaten full application of the severe
Sentencing Guidelines."35 Finally, the "diffuse and elastic" concepts of
"public interest or justice" supposedly furnish no constraints on
prosecutorial caprice, 36 and the lack of any significant form of review
"raises the prospect that . . . racial and ethnic minorities, social
outcasts, [and] the poor ... will be treated most harshly."37
According to many commentators, the dangers inherent in this
discretion have only increased with the burgeoning rate of plea
bargaining. The wide array of overlapping criminal offenses, coupled
with "savagely excessive sentences,"38 have given prosecutors an
arsenal with which to bully defendants into "trad[ing] excess charges
for a guilty plea" or "accept[ing] lesser punishments to avoid a
substantial risk of a much greater" one.39 By forcing defendants to
bargain away their only possible check on prosecutorial power-
judicial oversight-the prosecutor "combines both executive and
judicial power-posing the very danger the Framers tried to
prevent."40
Going further, many critics bemoan the very presence of plea
bargaining in the criminal justice system. With the criminal jury trial
becoming "almost as rare as the spotted owl," 41 the vast majority of
criminal cases are handled through these ostensibly contractual
arrangements. To many, this is a travesty. The critics accuse plea
bargaining of meting out criminal sanctions "without full
investigation, without testimony and evidence and impartial
factfinding";42 allocating punishment based "on wealth, sex, age,
education, intelligence, and confidence" rather than culpability;43 and
pushing innocent defendants to accept punishments for crimes they
35. Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of
Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1425 (2008).
36. Bibas, supra note 29, at 961-62.
37. Vorenberg, supra note 32, at 1555.
38. Luban, supra note 19, at 1744.
39. Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV.
29, 33 (2002).
40. Barkow, supra note 31, at 1048.
41. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Uncertain Bargains: The Rise of Plea Bargaining in America, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1721, 1721-22 (2005) (reviewing GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A
HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003)); see also Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz,
Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992) (Plea bargaining "is not some
adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system").
42. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 41.
43. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARv. L. REV.
2464, 2468 (2004).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
did not commit, without the full discovery and safeguards of a
criminal trial. 4 4 Worse still, say various commentators, this state of
affairs is the result of "systemic" problems rather than private
ordering45 and is linked to the fact that "we punish people ... simply
for going to trial."4 6 Little room is left for respectful disagreement. As
one observer has asserted, "I assume rather wide agreement that, in
an ideal world, plea bargaining would be infrequent or nonexistent."4 7
Across the spectrum, critics have decried plea bargaining as
"unconstitutional,"48 a "disaster,"49 and a "dreadful monster[] of
American criminal justice."50
Implicit in the denunciation of prosecutorial discretion and
plea bargaining is the assumption that Congress "criminalizes too
much and sentences too harshly."51 Criminal punishment is not only
"getting harsher,"52 the narrative goes, but is "more degrading"53 than
the punishment meted out by most European countries. The fact that
punishment is in part a product of the democratic process has not
given the detractors pause. Quite the opposite. Some scholars dismiss
the public's "views regarding the crime rate and the need to control
criminal activity" as "notoriously inaccurate and overblown."54
Moreover, the critics seem impervious to the possibility of another
point of view, or at the very least the merits of a more nuanced
critique. Even where the charges contain real elements of truth, they
tend to be framed in sweeping terms. According to one scholar,
"Experienced practitioners, policy analysts, and researchers have long
agreed that mandatory penalties in all their forms ... are a bad
44. See Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive Criminal Law Values and Criminal
Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1383-85
(2003) (criticizing other commentators' conceptions of the plea bargaining process as fair to
criminal defendants).
45. Timothy Lynch, The Case Against Plea Bargaining, REG., Fall 2003, at 24, 27.
46. Berthoff v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 2d 50, 68-69 (D. Mass. 2001) (Young, C.J.).
47. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1039
(1984).
48. Lynch, supra note 45, at 24.
49. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 2009 (1992).
50. Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and the Death Penalty, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 671,
671 (2009).
51. Stuntz, supra note 30, at 844.
52. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING
DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 3 (2005).
53. Id. at 17.
54. PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE: WHY CRIMINAL LAW
DOESN'T GIVE PEOPLE WHAT THEY DESERVE 4 (2006).
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idea."5 5 And another, bemoaning high rates of imprisonment, suggests
that "[t]heorists of nearly every ideological stripe are . . . united in
their support for alternative sanctions"56 for many crimes.
Not all counts in the indictment are the same. The historic
mistreatment of African-Americans at the hands of the criminal
justice system is widely acknowledged, and no one would contend that
the vestiges of those tragic practices have all been removed. How best
to overcome this historic stain on the system remains a matter of
debate. It is apparent, however, that the charge of racial disparity is
an undercurrent of the entire assault on the system and of the attack
on the death penalty in particular. Racial disparities are often
explained as intentional and deep-rooted features of the system, for
example, as the result of a "combination of police practices and
legislative and executive policy decisions that systematically treat
black offenders differently, and more severely, than whites."67 And
legal scholarship is rife with the accusation that "the practice of
imposing and executing death sentences preponderantly upon African-
American defendants and those convicted of crimes against white
victims has become a ubiquitous, deeply entrenched feature of the
American courthouse scene."58
What is more, according to the critics, there has been little to
no sign of progress. In fact, "[T]he advent of mandatory guidelines and
mandatory minimums created a new kind of racial unfairness that did
not previously exist."59 As a recent op-ed author charged, the death
penalty "remains as racist and as random as ever."60 For many
academics, therefore, the only remedy is its abolition. And with
respect to racial inequities more generally, the call for abolition, not
reform, is often the course of first resort. As one scholar suggests,
racial disparities should be addressed through "radical decarceration;
fundamental changes in drug policy; [and] repeal of mandatory
minimum, three-strikes, and life without possibility of parole laws."6'
55. Michael Tonry, The Mostly Unintended Effects of Mandatory Penalties: Two Centuries
of Consistent Findings, 38 CRIME & JUST. 65, 65 (2009).
56. Dan M. Kahan, Punishment Incommensurability, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 691, 691-92
(1998).
57. Michael Tonry, The Social, Psychological, and Political Causes of Racial Disparities in
the American Criminal Justice System, 39 CRIME & JUST. 273, 274 (2010).
58. E.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Opening Remarks: Race and the Death Penalty Before
and After McCleskey, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 34, 37 (2007).
59. Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1686 (2012).
60. David R. Dow, Death Penalty, Still Racist and Arbitrary, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2011, at
A19.
61. Tonry, supra note 57, at 307.
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Some of the above critiques have an element of truth. But if the
critics are correct, our criminal justice system is not only broken, but
very nearly beyond repair. Instead of possessing both strengths and
weaknesses, it fails us in every respect. If people knew of American
criminal law only through modern commentary, they could be forgiven
for thinking it is impossible for a defendant ever to get a fair trial.
Judging by the critics' descriptions, the accused face a justice system
that the centuries have done little to improve; the process the accused
receive will be now, as always, "nasty, brutish, and short."6 2 For the
life of me, I cannot see how this bleak picture accords with reality.
Whatever problems our system has, it cannot be as bad as all that.
III. A DEFENSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
In light of this sweeping and skewed indictment, it is time to
provide a fairer appraisal of the American criminal justice system.
The wisdom of its tradeoffs, the value of its front-end features, and the
vitality of its democratic taproots make our criminal justice system
worthy of admiration and respect. Many of our system's supposed
deficiencies-from convicting the innocent to inadequately defending
the accused-are the result of difficult but necessary tradeoffs
between competing values. The great strength of the system is that it
ensures that many of the most contestable choices are made
democratically, and not imposed by elites who operate outside the
political arena and whose perspective, while valuable, has slipped too
uncritically into a collective one-sidedness. By acknowledging the
virtues of our institutions, we can begin to approach their inevitable
failings with the recognition that neither diagnosis nor cure is all that
simple.
A. The Inevitability of Tradeoffs: Wrongful Convictions
Why are tradeoffs between the claims of society and rights of
the accused both necessary and beneficial? Because when a country
fails to enforce vigorously its criminal law, it sacrifices both its moral
and legal fiber. But when a country countenances sloppiness and
shortcuts in the execution of its criminal proscriptions, it sacrifices its
sacred heritage of liberty under law. A tension between these two
supreme values cannot be resolved other than through compromise,
62. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 89 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991)
(1651).
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and the American criminal justice system has for the most part
managed these essential tradeoffs well.
Let us begin with the charge of wrongful convictions, a
perennial issue that the critics have cleverly used as the drumbeat for
reform. Of course, this accusation is hardly novel. Nor is the
counterargument that it is much exaggerated. In 1923, Judge Learned
Hand expressed his skepticism: "Our procedure has been always
haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal
dream." 6 3 We need not go so far as to say the concern is unreal-it
suffices to respect Judge Hand's observation that "we must work with
human beings and we can correct such errors only at too large a
price."6 4 Systems of criminal justice depend inescapably on the
judgment of people-be they judges, jurors, prosecutors, or defense
attorneys-and so the system will necessarily have much the same
capacity for error as the people who comprise it. The proper question
is not, as so many critics would have it, "What parts of the system
must be overhauled to reduce conviction of the innocent?" Rather, it
must be, "How can we calibrate the balance struck by our system so as
to avoid the concededly deplorable outcomes of conviction of an
innocent man and exoneration of the guilty?"
This notion of proper balancing has a long history in our
conception of criminal justice. It dates at least to Abraham's colloquy
with God over how many innocent citizens of Sodom and Gomorrah
must exist to spare the cities from destruction.65 This parable evolved
into the familiar criminal law teaching of the "Blackstone ratio,"66
derived from that venerable author's admonition that it is "better that
ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer."67 At its core,
the ratio is not about the proper statistical distribution of convictions
and acquittals; despite the best efforts of scholars,68 the true question
defies mathematics. The ratio is about balancing the twin aims of our
criminal justice system: How do we punish as many of the deserving
guilty as possible while ensnaring as few of the innocent as possible?
Or, more simply: How does a civilized society remain both safe and
free?
63. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
64. Id.
65. Genesis 18:23-32.
66. Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 174 (1997).
67. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358.
68. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 65,
75-80 (2008) (attempting to create formulas assessing the rates of false convictions and false
acquittals).
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Critics threaten to upset this balance in addressing the two
most frequently cited causes of wrongful convictions: mistaken
eyewitness identifications and false confessions. In a recent decision
overhauling its state's procedures for eyewitness identifications, the
New Jersey Supreme Court declared "eyewitness misidentification [to
be] the leading cause of wrongful convictions across the country."69
The court based this conclusion on a review of scientific literature
purporting to establish the fallibility of eyewitnesses' memories and
the cognitive biases that prevent jurors from properly weighing
eyewitness testimony.70 Importantly, the U.S. Supreme Court has held
that due process requires an eyewitness identification to be excluded
only if it was tainted by "suggestive" police conduct and it lacks
sufficient indicia of reliability.71 But the critics would go further and
subject all allegedly "suggestive" identifications to pretrial
admissibility hearingS72  or even categorically exclude all
identifications elicited under conditions that fail to comport with
certain procedural safeguards.73
Critics perceive a similarly dire threat in-and call for
similarly sweeping solutions to-the problem of false confessions.
They acknowledge that coerced confessions and those obtained in the
absence of Miranda warnings are already subject to exclusion under
the Fifth Amendment. 74 Involuntariness and alleged unreliability,
however, do not seem quite the same. The former speaks to
constitutionality; the latter to the quintessential jury question of
whether a confession is more or less true. Even as the critics concede
that "we still do not know (and probably will never know) the
69. New Jersey v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 878 (N.J. 2011).
70. See id. at 894-912 (discussing scientific studies on eyewitness testimony and juror
understanding of eyewitness reliability). For an overview of this literature, see GARRETT, supra
note 10, at 45-83.
71. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 720 (2012) (citing Simmons v. United States,
390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)).
72. This was the approach adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Henderson. See 27
A.3d at 878.
73. See, e.g., Timothy P. O'Toole & Giovanna Shay, Manson v. Brathwaite Revisited:
Towards a New Rule of Decision for Due Process Challenges to Eyewitness Identification
Procedures, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 109, 136-39 (2006) (suggesting an alternative to existing
eyewitness identification rules).
74. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 302 (1991) (granting a new trial with
exclusion of coerced confession); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966) (establishing
exclusionary rule for confessions obtained without warnings); Welsh S. White, What Is an
Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERs L. REV. 2001, 2014-20 (1998) (discussing the post-
Miranda voluntariness test).
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incidence of false confessions,"75 they insist that "the empirical
evidence shows that standard [police] interrogation techniques are
likely to lead to untrustworthy confessions in a significant number of
cases."76 In light of this evidence, critics not only would reform police
interrogation procedures but also would require pretrial hearings to
assess the reliability of confessions in light of the circumstances in
which they were made.77 Such an approach would have trial judges
exclude many more confessions rather than allow jurors to make their
own determinations.
I do not deny the existence of mistaken eyewitness
identifications and unreliable confessions. And I of course support the
efforts of legislatures, law-enforcement agencies, and the criminal
defense bar to enhance the accuracy and reliability of such evidence.
Photo lineups in particular need some tightening up, with blind
lineups-where the officer directing the lineup is not aware of the
suspect's identity-being a frequently suggested improvement.78 But
the critics' proposed solutions-a significant increase in cumbersome
pretrial hearings and the outright exclusion of relevant evidence-go
too far. Our criminal justice system does not attempt to avoid
wrongful convictions at all costs, but rather balances this imperative
against the need to protect public safety by punishing people who
commit crimes. In striking this balance, the system depends on the
adversarial process to test the reliability of evidence. As the Supreme
Court recently put it, "The Constitution .. . protects a defendant
against a conviction based on evidence of questionable reliability, not
by prohibiting introduction of the evidence, but by affording the
defendant means to persuade the jury that the evidence should be
discounted as unworthy of credit."79 The appropriate way to prevent
wrongful convictions based on allegedly mistaken identifications and
allegedly unreliable confessions is rigorous adversarial testing, not
additional pretrial screening and exclusion. In urging the latter
75. Richard A. Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal
Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479, 515.
76. Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against
Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 110 (1997).
77. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV.
1051, 1109-13 (2010) (suggesting ways to regulate the substance of confessions); Leo et al., supra
note 75, at 531-35.
78. See Spencer S. Hsu, 9 in 10 Va. Police Agencies Fall Short of Photo Lineup Guidelines
Meant to Reduce Mistakes, http://perma.cc/T9R9-Z8TH (washingtonpost.com, archived Mar. 12,
2014) (discussing failure of police departments to implement improved guidelines for lineups
despite misidentification problems).
79. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 723 (2012).
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course, critics ignore the fact that the whole reason for a trial is to
determine how persuasive the evidence actually is.
Perhaps the most telling example of our system striking a
balance between punishing the guilty and protecting the innocent is
the instruction that jurors must find criminal defendants guilty as
charged "beyond a reasonable doubt." This illustration is of course
linked to Blackstone's ratio, since "one of the major variables in
achieving that ratio is the degree of certainty we impose on
factfinders."80 It bears noting what "reasonable doubt" is not: it is
decidedly not the same as "by a preponderance of the evidence" (a
simple more-likely-than-not standard),81 or even "clear and convincing
evidence" (somewhere between the preponderance standard and that
of reasonable doubt).82 The adoption of differing standards of proof for
civil and criminal cases acknowledges what social scientists call
"different disutilities for errors in different situations."83 Or as John
Rawls put it, "[T]he correct regulative principle for anything depends
on the nature of that thing."84 We acknowledge that wrongfully
depriving an innocent man of his liberty is a worse outcome than
wrongfully picking his pocket with an erroneous civil judgment,85 so
we strive to find a balance that does not tip too far in favor of a crime
control policy that depends on incarcerating the blameless.
And yet "reasonable doubt" does not require absolute certainty.
Jeremy Bentham voiced the concern that "[a]ccording to [Blackstone's]
maxim, nobody ought to be punished, lest an innocent man be
punished."86 Bentham was right to be worried, because society pays a
80. Jon 0. Newman, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Madison
Lecture: Beyond "Reasonable Doubt" (Nov. 9, 1993), in 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 981 (1993).
81. Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508
U.S. 602, 622 (1993).
82. In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 818 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting that "clear and convincing
evidence" is a more rigorous standard than simply "more likely than not").
83. Michael J. Saks & Samantha Neufeld, Convergent Evolution in Law and Science: The
Structure of Decision-Making Under Uncertainty, 10 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 133, 135 tbl. 1
(2011).
84. Mark C. Murphy, Natural Law and the Moral Absolute Against Lying, 41 AM. J. JURIs.
81, 84 n. 15 (1996) (quoting JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 29 (1st ed. 1971)).
85. In addition, the more punitive the nature of the civil judgment, the more demanding
the standard of proof. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Dana A. Remus, Advocacy Revalued, 159 U.
PA. L. REV. 751, 763 n.50 (2011) ("In certain civil cases where the stakes are higher, such as
where punitive damages may be awarded, courts may require facts against the defendant to be
established by clear and convincing evidence."). The standard further illustrates the use of
differing burdens of proof to reflect different degrees of perceived harm from an erroneous
outcome.
86. James R. Acker & Catherine L. Bonventre, Protecting the Innocent in New York.-
Moving Beyond Changing Only Their Names, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1245, 1253 n.35 (2010) (quoting M.
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price every time a guilty criminal walks our streets, a cost too often
overlooked by those preoccupied exclusively with the conviction of the
innocent. As early as 1969, the singular focus on wrongful convictions
in the indictment of our criminal justice system had become so
insistent that it led Justice Black to quip that "[i]t is seemingly
becoming more and more difficult to gain acceptance for the
proposition that punishment of the guilty is desirable."87 In reality,
"there is and must be a limit to our willingness to protect the innocent
at the expense of public safety,"88 for as much as innocent defendants
are horribly victimized by wrongful convictions, so too are innocent
citizens victimized a second time by the failure to punish those who
commit horrible crimes against them. 8 9 My point is ultimately a
simple one: the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard balances our
concern about doing injustice to innocent defendants against our
concern about doing injustice to the victims of crime. Each of these
concerns seeks to ward off deeply inhumane inflictions on innocent
citizens at the hands of, or as a result of, the erroneous actions of the
state.
Beyond a reasonable doubt seems to me a particularly elegant
way to strike this balance. Not only does the reasonable-doubt
standard seek a rhetorical equilibrium between the government's
"moral obligation to protect its people from crimes . . . and
[its] . . . moral obligation to respect various constraints placed on its
power, including desert-based limitations on punishment."90 It also
frames the balancing test in terms of the real world inhabited by the
jurors asked to apply it. Judges occasionally describe the government's
burden in terms that make the decision to convict a personal one for
jurors, instructing them, "Proof beyond a reasonable doubt must,
therefore, be proof of such a convincing character that a reasonable
person would not hesitate to rely and act upon it in the most
important of his own affairs."91 While I believe any elaboration upon
the reasonable-doubt standard is a dangerous instructional exercise, I
DUMONT, A TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, EXTRACTED FROM THE MANUSCRIPTS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM, ESQ. 198 (1825)).
87. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 240-41 (Black, J., dissenting).
88. Keith A. Findley, Toward a New Paradigm of Criminal Justice: How the Innocence
Movement Merges Crime Control and Due Process, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 133, 134 (2008).
89. Kent Roach, Four Models of the Criminal Process, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 671,
695-96 (1999).
90. Youngjae Lee, Deontology, Political Morality, and the State, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 385,
402 (2011).
91. 1 LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS X 4.02, Instruction
4-2 (1993).
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have little doubt that the standard itself leads jurors to a thorough
examination of the evidence and encourages them to strike the
balance according to their highest sense of duty, not the questionable
math of Blackstone's ancient aphorism.
The genius of the reasonable-doubt formulation and the sense
of balance and duty it brings to jury deliberations can, of course, be
overstated. But though relatively few cases go to trial, the standard
serves as a welcome backdrop to pretrial investigations and plea
negotiations, warning prosecutors off a flimsy case. And though the
standard may not serve to rescue every inadequately defended case, it
doubtlessly adds to acquittals in a good many circumstances,
especially when coupled with the requirement that a jury be
unanimous. For notwithstanding the benefits of federalism, a
constitutional requirement of jury unanimity is indispensable to
reducing the rate of error in criminal cases, thereby raising confidence
in the system. I have come to believe that the Supreme Court's
decisions in Johnson v. Louisiana92 (holding that a state law allowing
conviction by only nine of twelve jurors does not violate due process)
and Apodaca v. Oregon93 (conviction by ten of twelve) were serious
mistakes. Most jurors who hold out do so for acquittal, and the need to
convince the remaining one or two doubters helps ensure that verdicts
adverse to the defendant have been carefully thought through. The
reasonable-doubt standard in fact poses a substantial enough burden
upon the prosecution that it often leads to frustration over high profile
acquittals: the O.J. Simpson and George Zimmerman trials are prime
examples. But that the jury takes the standard seriously should be
cause for respect, not anger or alarm.
In some respects, the burden of beyond a reasonable doubt is
itself part of a larger equipoise within our criminal justice system: the
emphasis on vindicating the rights of the accused early, through the
trial process, rather than late, through endless collateral attack. This
too is a balance the critics would upset in favor of extended collateral
review, believing that an "inmate's best chance of having
his ... constitutional rights vindicated traditionally occurs after filing
a writ of habeas corpus in federal court."94 It is no accident that
collateral review gives learned judges greater opportunities to vacate
lay jury verdicts for a variety of alleged errors. I suspect that many of
92. 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972).
93. 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972).
94. Kenneth Williams, The Deregulation of the Death Penalty, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 677,
681 (2000).
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the critics would admit to a greater affinity for judges than for jurors
and for federal more than for state courts. Be that as it may, the
action of a single federal district judge overturning, say, a seven-
member state supreme court, or overriding twelve jurors who actually
sat through trial, is something that should occur less rather than more
frequently. Among judges, what is or is not a wrongful conviction is
often less a matter of timeless truth than what lies in the eye of the
beholder. And it is no knock on American criminal justice that it
declines to allow the most minor doubts about conviction to devalue
the common sense of juries or to undermine the utility of finality in
expressing the firmness of social judgment and in allowing a true
rehabilitation process to begin.
Those who bemoan American criminal justice can hardly doubt
its amplitude of process. Judge Henry Friendly lamented that "[a]fter
trial, conviction, sentence, appeal, affirmance, and denial of certiorari
by the Supreme Court, . . . the criminal process, in Winston
Churchill's phrase, has not reached the end, or even the beginning of
the end, but only the end of the beginning."95 The tradeoff for this
abundant process must be that the later stages of review adopt a
genuinely deferential posture to the earlier, reversing a conviction
only when the outcome "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law,"96 or when the accused
presents facts "sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence
that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have
found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense."97 Were it
otherwise, the foundational concepts of trial and direct appeal would
be reduced to near meaninglessness. That such eminently sensible
tradeoffs should be a source of consternation-characterized by one
critic as "flawed procedures that ultimately blur the line between
rational justice and irrational vengeance"" 8 -deals the system still
another bad academic rap.
The Bill of Rights accords with the view I share with Judge
Friendly, that due process is early process, not perpetual review. The
initial constitutional emphasis in our system is upon constraints on
the collection of evidence in the first place, either through
95. Henry J. Friendly, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Ernst Freund
Lecture: Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments (1970), in 38 U. CHI.
L. REV. 142, 142 (1970).
96. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012).
97. Id. § 2254(e)(2)(B).
98. Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive Problems in Capital
Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 699, 795 (2002).
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unreasonable searches or coercive interrogation. The Constitution's
second great emphasis is upon trial. It must be "speedy and public."99
The accused possesses the right to "the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence," 00 the right not to be compelled to give evidence against
himself, 101 the right to confront the evidence and witnesses against
him before a jury of his peers, and the right to compel the production
of evidence in his defense.102 And should he be acquitted, he has the
right to leave the courthouse secure in the knowledge that he may not
be placed in jeopardy again.103 Should the prosecution later acquire
damning evidence, too late and too bad.
This litany-however familiar-bears repetition, because
notably absent from the express enumerations of the Framers is much
of an emphasis upon collateral review.104 The presence of federal
habeas review as a necessary backstop of last resort can hardly
obscure the fact that the Bill of Rights writ large represents a system
of criminal justice designed to emphasize trial and the heavy
presumption of validity of the judgment rendered therein. This
emphasis upon early resolution and early vindication ultimately
serves the interests of the accused in the most practical way. For
federal habeas relief comes, if at all, very late in the day. The writ may
serve as something of a vindication, but only a partial and belated one.
Years generally elapse between the conclusion of trial and the
termination of collateral proceedings, and in noncapital cases, habeas
relief may be little more than a salve or palliative for an inmate whose
sentence has already been substantially served.
It is worth spending time upon the whole issue of collateral
review because it is here-in a quest for virtually de novo collateral
proceedings-that critics have staked their hopes that the underlying
errors and injustices of American criminal justice can be at least
partially corrected. Thus we have witnessed the ubiquitous ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim. Such claims are occasionally justified. Far
more often, though, they render an acute disservice to attorneys in the
trial arena whose professional judgment is questioned whenever, in
hindsight, it did not lead to an optimal outcome, even in a hopelessly
suboptimal case. We have likewise witnessed the effort to
99. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (2012).
100. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
101. Id. amend. V.
102. Id. amend. VI.
103. Id. amend. V.
104. See id. art. I, § 9 (stating that the "Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it").
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constitutionalize access to DNA evidence in postconviction
proceedings, 05 ignoring the host of difficult practical and technological
questions that legislative involvement may flexibly address and that
constitutionalizing the area may rigidify.
All this emphasis upon ultimate innocence has led some who
discredit the American system to overlook its promise of early
vindication and prompt justice. The complaint in any front-loaded
system will invariably be that insufficient investigatory resources are
afforded the accused, a complaint that is sometimes exaggerated, at
other times just. The answer, however, is not to back up the system,
and to their great credit, the Framers did not. Collateral relief from
state convictions is not only late, but also unlikely, given the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (commonly
known as "AEDPA"). Attorneys and firms that place their often
splendid talents in collateral proceedings are missing the Framers'
point. A conviction is not ipso facto the sign of a failure of the system,
any more than is the fact of acquittal. Both reflect a preference for
early process. The tradeoff for early process is again the quintessential
one. Fresher evidence and quicker absolution (or punishment) are set
against the possibilities, always present but often theoretical, that
something somewhere might have been done differently and that
something somewhere might have gone amiss.
The preference for fact-finding by lay juries applying standards
enunciated in terms of common experience may be largely an Anglo-
American phenomenon, and other nations have struck the balance
differently. For example, "[T]he European judicial model[,] . . . made
perhaps most famous through John Langbein's much cited" work on
German courts, 106 serves as a useful point of comparison. Langbein
has explained that the German model relies on mixed panels of judges
and jurors that need not reach a unanimous verdict in order to convict
and in which the judges act as both prosecution and defense in
examining witnesses.107 Appellate review is concomitantly different.
In some cases, complete retrial before a new panel is provided; in
others, review by a large number of judges. And in all cases, the
prosecution enjoys the same entitlement to appeal as the defense.108 I
105. See, e.g., Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 67-75 (2009) (holding that the
Due Process Clause does not create a right to DNA evidence in a postconviction context).
106. Amalia D. Kessler, Marginalization and Myth: The Corporatist Roots of France's
Forgotten Elective Judiciary, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 679, 679 (2010).
107. John H. Langbein, Mixed Court and Jury Court: Could the Continental Alternative Fill
the American Need?, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 195, 199-201.
108. See id. (describing the appeals process within German criminal courts).
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offer this example not to compare the merits of the two systems-
although I disagree with Langbein's conclusion that "the presence of
professional judges in deliberations" is a necessary "safeguard[]
against lay inexperience" 109-but rather to demonstrate that the
design of any system of criminal justice incorporates this notion of
balance. Germany has opted for a less rigorous, less adversarial
procedure at trial than we have enshrined in our Constitution, but it
has complemented that with more extensive appellate review. We
have chosen an inverse approach, one that gives the jury a big say,
entrusting it with weighing the case for guilt or acquittal, in a trial
process replete with procedural protections for the accused. Tacking
on ponderous proceedings down the line upsets the balance of our
system and is ill suited to the panoply of rights at trial that is the
cornerstone of our constitutional design.
At the end of the day, the debate between Blackstone and
Bentham over the acceptable ratio of improper acquittals to wrongful
convictions is not one on which the Constitution strictly takes sides.
That is to say, the Constitution does not guarantee a particular result;
it does not guarantee that an innocent person will never be convicted
or that a guilty person will never be set free. It instead guarantees a
process that is designed to promote accuracy. To the extent the
Constitution does put a thumb on the scale in either direction, the
processes afforded under the Bill of Rights and the due process roots of
the reasonable-doubt standard suggest that it does so in favor of the
accused. But one could also read the Constitution as recognizing that
perfect accuracy is impossible, for instance, through its guarantee of a
"speedy and public trial," but not a "perfect" one. 110 Perfection cannot
be a constitutional guarantee because the process involves human
juries, judges, and attorneys, and human nature is not perfect. Our
goal should thus be to make the process as accurate as we can, relying
especially on legislative reforms and improvements in technology to
bring about greater accuracy. The Constitution encourages such
efforts to minimize error, but it also encourages critics to bear in mind
that perfect accuracy is, at bottom, not a part of its fundamental
design.
109. Id. at 202.
110. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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B. Tradeoffs in Criminal Adjudication: The Right to Counsel
If the American criminal justice system is front-loaded, if it
trusts more in the adversarial exchange at trial to determine guilt and
innocence than in appellate and collateral review, then we must ask
whether this trust is well placed. Does criminal adjudication
adequately protect defendants from wrongful conviction, or does it
instead stack the deck in favor of the prosecution? Most commentators
argue that the current structure of criminal adjudication confers an
unfair advantage on prosecutors. Foremost among the numerous
counts of this indictment is the claim that criminal defendants, the
majority of whom are indigent, often receive inadequate
representation, rendering them vulnerable to powerful, overzealous
government lawyers. Although the Supreme Court has recognized a
constitutional right to counsel in Gideon v. Wainwright,111 that right,
in the eyes of skeptics, has proved a hollow promise. As one critic puts
it, "No constitutional right is celebrated so much in the abstract and
observed so little in reality as the right to counsel. .. . For far too
many people accused of crimes, the right to counsel is meaningless
and unenforceable." 112 And without a meaningful right to counsel,
criminal adjudication cannot be trusted to apportion justice without
regard to defendants' financial circumstances.
Critics identify a number of supposed defects in the current
system of indigent criminal defense. They begin by asserting that the
lawyers who represent indigent defendants are among the least
competent members of the bar. Whereas the best and the brightest
law school graduates are typically thought to become corporate
lawyers or prosecutors, lawyers for indigent defendants "are
considered the stepchildren of the justice system and are looked upon
as biding their time until they can get a 'real job.' "113 Critics tend to
attribute this dearth of talent to the compensation that lawyers for
indigent defendants receive, which tends to be "at the lowest end of
the professional pay scale." 114 More generally, they argue that Gideon
111. 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
112. Bright, supra note 16, at 5.
113. Heather Baxter, Gideon's Ghost: Providing the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel in
Times of Budgetary Crisis, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 341, 350-51 (footnote omitted) (quoting LEE
SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS 149 (1965)).
114. Note, Gideon's Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent Defense,
113 HARV. L. REV. 2062, 2064 (2000) (footnote omitted) (citing Martinez-Macias v. Collins, 979
F.2d 1067, 1067 (5th Cir. 1992) (Higginbotham, J.)).
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"has been gutted by indifference and financial neglect."115 Indeed, they
consider an acute lack of funding to be "[t]he central obstacle to
adequate representation of indigent criminal defendants."" 6 The
Great Recession and its aftermath have only exacerbated this
financial shortfall, for "when states go chopping, those who represent
indigent defendants are usually at the top of the chopping block."117
The system of indigent criminal defense is thus alleged to labor under
severe deficits of both financial and human capital.
Even as society has supposedly denied necessary resources to
the lawyers who represent indigent defendants, it has asked them to
assume ever more onerous caseloads. According to the U.S.
Department of Justice, "From 1999 to 2007, public-defender program
caseloads increased by 20% while staffing increased by 4%."118 Some
critics go so far as to argue that excessive caseloads create a
troublesome conflict of interest for public defenders: saddled with
hundreds of cases and starved of the resources necessary to fully
attend to each, public defenders have no choice but to induce their
clients to accept whatever plea bargain prosecutors offer, irrespective
of its terms. 119 This conflict is allegedly even more vexing for court-
appointed counsel, whose compensation, unlike that of public
defenders, is often subject to a cap for each case and who thus have
especially strong incentives "to push plea bargains and dispatch with
cases quickly and with little investigation."120 Simply put, society is
115. Editorial, Fulfilling Gideon's Promise: The Justice Department's Push for Better Legal
Representation for Poor Defendants, WASH. POST, Mar. 9. 2010, at A18.
116. Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Grieving Criminal Defense Lawyers, 70 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1615, 1620 (2002).
117. Baxter, supra note 113, at 353.
118. LYNN LANGTON & DAVID FAROLE, JR., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, CENSUS OF PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007: STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER PROGRAMS 18
(2010) [hereinafter BJS STATE]; see also id. at 12-14 (noting that many state public defender
programs exceeded recommended caseload limits); DONALD J. FAROLE, JR. & LYNN LANGTON,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES,
2007: COUNTY-BASED AND LOCAL PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES 1, 8-10 (2010) [hereinafter BJS
COUNTY] (discussing caseloads in county-based public defender offices).
119. See generally Heidi Reamer Anderson, Funding Gideon's Promise by Viewing Excessive
Caseloads as Unethical Conflicts of Interest, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 421, 421-24 (2012)
(arguing that underfunding public defenders creates conflicts of interest). But see Douglas D.
Guidorizzi, Should We Really 'Ban" Plea Bargaining?: The Core Concerns of Plea Bargaining
Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753, 765-66 (1998) (noting that "[t]he quick disposition of cases allows
public defenders to give more time and effort to the cases they consider more trial-worthy").
120. Emily Giarelli, Note, Rethinking Webb, Reallocating Resources: When Virginia's Fee
Caps Create Conflicts of Interest, Public Defenders Must Provide Alternatives, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 569, 569 (2011).
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asking lawyers who represent indigent defendants to do more with
less.
All these alleged defects would be somewhat less disconcerting
to critics if prosecutors faced similar resource constraints. In that
case, at least criminal adjudication could be said to be "fair" in the
sense that neither side would enjoy a significant advantage over the
other. But critics argue that prosecutors have significantly more
resources and receive significantly higher levels of compensation than
lawyers who represent indigent defendants.121 Indeed, "poor
defendants . . . 'receive only an eighth of the resources per case
available to prosecutors.' "122 Because of such disparities, even the
most capable defense counsel often cannot prepare their cases as
thoroughly as prosecutors prepare theirs. In particular, whereas
prosecutors have extensive police and other investigative resources at
their disposal, public-defender offices typically have only a small
handful of investigators on staff-if they have any at all. 123
Consequently, public defenders must, to a significant degree, rely on
prosecution-conducted investigations, a reliance that critics believe
undermines the adversarial presuppositions of criminal
adjudication.124
The claim that resource disparity undermines the quality of
criminal defense is a recurrent one. It is true that prosecutors
generally have access to more investigative resources than criminal
defendants. Brady v. Maryland,25 which requires prosecutors to turn
over exculpatory evidence to defendants, may help to rectify this
imbalance. But this cure is incomplete because what evidence
121. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 113, at 362-63.
122. Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, a National
Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1045 n.60 (2006) (citation omitted) (quoting DEBORAH L. RHODE,
ACCESS TO JUSTICE 123 (2004)).
123. See BJS COUNTY, supra note 118, at 1, 12 (discussing the lack of investigative resources
among county-based public defender offices); BJS STATE, supra note 118, at 1, 16 (noting that
state public defender programs had "1 investigator for every 6 [full-time equivalent] litigating
attorneys in 2007").
124. See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Failures of the American Adversarial System To Protect
the Innocent and Conceptual Advantages in the Inquisitorial Design for Investigative Fairness, 36
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 319, 362 (2011) (claiming "a theoretical advantage in the basic
design of the more neutral inquisitorial method of fact investigation as opposed to the partisan
design of the adversarial systems, which with a chronically and significantly underfunded
defense effectively puts investigative control in the hands of the prosecutor").
125. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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qualifies as "exculpatory" or "material" is open to interpretation. 1 2 6 An
open-file policy, where prosecutors make files more broadly available
to defendants, is also not fully ameliorative, because such policies may
be subject to exceptions with respect to sensitive witnesses and
informants, and because the evidence in the open file may be gathered
by investigators intent on building a case.
Still, it makes little sense to ask whether a differential exists
(of course it does) without asking why it exists. It exists in good part
because law enforcement is the initiator (i.e., government often has no
choice but to investigate, frequently from scratch). Moreover, many
law-enforcement investigations come up empty or well short of what it
takes to go forward with a case. Yet even the drilling of dry holes
consumes time and investigative resources. In fact, it may occasionally
be a boon to suspects for law enforcement to possess the resources to
investigate; a department short on such resources might be tempted to
cut corners and press a half-baked case. The most beneficial question
a prosecutor can pose to law-enforcement officers is, "Are you sure?"
And one can often not be sure without the aid of thorough
investigation.
Many critics also go so far as to blame the poor quality of
indigent criminal defense for the spate of wrongful convictions that
have come to light in recent years. 127 On this view, the failings of
indigent criminal defense produce profound injustice. Critics worry,
moreover, that such injustice will almost never be rectified on
appellate or collateral review, for the constitutional standard for
ineffective assistance of counsel, as articulated by the Supreme Court
in Strickland v. Washington,128 allegedly tolerates gross incompetence
by defense lawyers. Indeed, critics claim that "the Supreme Court has
set the standard of representation so low as to be virtually
meaningless" 129 -"effectively discard[ing] Gideon's noble trumpet call
126. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976) (holding that the proper
constitutional standard for materiality is "if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that
did not otherwise exist").
127. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument
from Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 802-04 (2004); see also Backus & Marcus,
supra note 122, at 1036 ("We now have evidence that overworked and incompetent lawyers
contribute to wrongful convictions . . ."); Bright, supra note 16, at 7 (claiming that DNA-based
exonerations have "demonstrated the most drastic consequence of inadequate representation-
conviction of the innocent").
128. 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
129. Bright, supra note 16, at 6.
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to justice in favor of a weak tin horn."130 In its right-to-counsel
jurisprudence, critics conclude, the Supreme Court has only
compounded the many shortcomings that plague our system of
indigent criminal defense.
I do not deny that the foregoing indictment of indigent criminal
defense contains some truth, but I part company with the critics
insofar as they perceive a systemic problem of constitutional
proportions. Their most elementary error is to equate any correlation
between defective representation and wrongful convictions with a
causal relationship between the two. Recognizing that wrongful
convictions unfortunately occur, it simply does not follow that
inadequate representation is the culprit; there are too many
confounding variables in the criminal justice system to draw so facile
an inference. Nor can we automatically pronounce a conviction suspect
simply because the defendant's counsel performed below par. The
Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a fair trial, not an
acquittal. That guarantee can be satisfied even when defense counsel's
performance is below average, as some performances are bound by the
law of averages to be.
Moreover, there is always going to be variation in performance,
and not just on the defense side. Some prosecutors are going to do an
inferior job. Some judges are more on the ball than others. Some
people naturally make better witnesses than others. Juries, too, are
more or less acute. Variation will always be present in so human an
endeavor as a criminal trial. While more money and resources will
improve matters on the margins, there will remain the variation that
is the source of dissatisfaction for those who wish the system to satisfy
some idealized standard of identicality. Hence, there will always be
finger-pointing at the end of the day when, for whatever human
happenstance, the verdict does not suit.
I also question whether the state of indigent criminal defense is
really as dire as the critics suggest. In particular, the critics too often
fail to distinguish among the various sources of criminal defense,
tarring all with the same brush when each in fact has its own distinct
strengths and shortcomings. Some criminal defendants, of course, can
afford to hire their own counsel. To provide representation for the
great majority of defendants who are indigent, jurisdictions typically
employ one of two systems, or some mix thereof. One system involves
public-defender offices, staffed by full-time, government-employed
130. William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical
Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 93 (1995).
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lawyers. Another relies on court-appointed private practitioners. 1 31
Though the critics often tend to conflate these different sources of
representation, the strength of their indictment actually varies with
respect to each.
The indictment has the least force where defendants retain
private counsel with their own resources. As the Supreme Court has
recognized, "[T]he Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right
to be represented by an otherwise qualified attorney whom that
defendant can afford to hire, or who is willing to represent the
defendant even though he is without funds."132 Moreover, the Court
regularly holds defendants responsible for the miscalculations of their
lawyers.133 It is unfair, frankly, to fault the system for the failings of
lawyers whom defendants themselves have chosen. The criminal
justice system should not be chastised for the consequences of
defendants freely exercising their constitutional rights.
To be sure, many criminal defendants, while able to afford
some kind of lawyer, are too poor to hire the best. But defendants in
this situation will often continue to enjoy a meaningful choice of
representation and should thus bear responsibility for the
consequences of that choice. The standard for determining "indigence"
for purposes of state-provided counsel is sufficiently flexible that many
borderline defendants will qualify as indigent and will thus have a
choice between retaining their own counsel and accepting publicly
funded representation. 1 34 For example, an empirical study of all the
felony cases filed in 2002 in Denver, Colorado, found that a significant
number of defendants both qualified for state-appointed counsel and
131. For more on the various sources of counsel for indigent defendants, see Baxter, supra
note 113, at 348-49.
132. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144 (2006) (quoting Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624-25 (1989)); see also Wheat v. United States, 486
U.S. 153, 159 (1988) ("[The right to select and be represented by one's preferred attorney is
comprehended by the Sixth Amendment. . . .").
133. See, e.g., Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 450-53 (2000) (holding that an
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim may provide cause to excuse a different procedurally
defaulted habeas claim, but only if the ineffective-assistance claim is either not procedurally
defaulted or is excused by its own showing of "cause and prejudice"); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S.
400, 416-18 (1988) (upholding the exclusion of the testimony of a defense witness as a sanction
for a defense lawyer's violation of a discovery rule).
134. The Supreme Court has never explicitly defined "indigence," but rather has left it to the
states to determine which defendants are poor enough to require state-appointed counsel. See
Adam M. Gershowitz, The Invisible Pillar of Gideon, 80 IND. L.J. 571, 574-76 (2005). Although a
few states have adopted relatively specific criteria for making this determination, most have not,
affording trial courts significant discretion to define the scope of Gideon's guarantee. See id. at
581-84 (providing examples of states whose courts possess either "unfettered discretion," "wide
discretion," or "[1]ow [dliscretion" in determining whether defendants qualify as indigent).
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had sufficient resources to retain private counsel; these defendants
strategically chose between the two sources of representation,
selecting private counsel when they faced serious charges and public
defenders when they faced routine ones.135 At least where defendants
have this choice, we should not fault the criminal justice system for
allowing them to exercise it.
The indictment also rings false where defendants are
represented by professional public defenders. Here, the problem is one
of overgeneralization. Critics often use the term "public defender" as a
catchall phrase and tend to "generalize all public defenders, whether
federal or state," making "little effort . .. to distinguish between these
different jurisdictions."136 Such generalization is problematic because,
as one former federal public defender puts it, "[N]ot all defender
programs are created equal."137 Once we recognize the considerable
variation in public-defender programs, we see that the indictment is
exaggerated in at least two respects. First, though some public-
defender offices lack adequate resources, others can more than make
do. Traditionally, the federal public-defender system has been
"relatively well financed." 38 It is true, however, that the recent
sequestration has hit federal public-defender programs especially
hard. Their budgets are largely consumed by personnel costs, and the
reductions have thus brought the prospect of furloughs and even
layoffs.139 But neither U.S. Attorneys' officesI4o nor the federal
judiciary itself'4' has been spared.142 In a time of scarce public
135. See Morris B. Hoffman et al., An Empirical Study ofPublic Defender Effectiveness: Self-
Selection by the "Marginally Indigent," 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 223, 223, 250 (2005) (describing
how the seriousness of charges impacts the choice between private counsel and public defenders
for marginally indigent defendants).
136. Inga L. Parsons, "Making it a Federal Case": A Model for Indigent Representation, 1997
ANN. SURY. AM. L. 837, 838.
137. Id.
138. Adam Liptak, Public Defenders Get Better Marks When on Salary, N.Y. TIMES, July 14,
2007, at Al.
139. Paul L. Friedman & Reggie B. Walton, Public Defenders Offices Shouldn't Suffer Under
Sequestration, http://perma.cc/H89C-A6CC (washingtonpost.com, archived Mar. 10, 2014).
140. See Lisa Rein, Holder Says No Furloughs at Justice Department This Fiscal Year,
http://perma.cclSS84-CPHU (washingtonpost.com, archived Mar. 10, 2014) (stating that Attorney
General Holder "warned that if sequestration continues in the fiscal year that starts Oct. 1,
'furloughs are a distinct possibility' ").
141. Statement by Chief Judge William B. Traxler, Chairman, Executive Committee of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, Statement on Impact of Sequestration on Judiciary,
Defender Funding (Apr. 17, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/T9EE-EDFT ("The impact of
sequestration on the Judiciary is particularly harsh because the courts have no control over their
workload.").
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resources, cutbacks are not welcome, but neither is a spirit of shared
sacrifice too much to expect. Many of those who work in criminal
justice-prosecutors, defenders, judges, - and staff-could earn
substantially more "on the outside." Some portion of public
compensation surely lies in the belief that financial sacrifice and long
hours are well worth the satisfaction of laboring in a system that helps
Americans to experience the dual blessings of basic security and
constitutional liberty.
The fact that the entire third branch of government consumes
such a tiny portion of the federal budget (less than 0.2 percent, to be
exact) 143 argues for more funding. A small increase might do some real
good in a criminal justice system that, after all, safeguards bedrock
constitutional principles. And if, as I have argued, American criminal
justice is and should be a front-loaded system, it becomes important to
give the participants at trial the resources to do their job. In an ideal
universe, the various components of the criminal justice system would
get more than they now have. The point is that all phases of the
criminal justice system, from investigation to incarceration, have
always been subject to the laws of finite public resources. And even
the most justifiable pleas for more public funding for every aspect of
that system cannot change the fact that many other humane and
necessary projects legitimately compete in legislatures for
appropriations of their own. The criminal justice process is one voice
among many. And the fact that we believe our pleas to be the most
deserving does not change the fact that others think their claims are
special, too.
Neither the judiciary nor the public defender program has any
natural political constituency. Some legislators do not like the fact
that federal judges do not have to run for reelection. And many
members of Congress are not sympathetic either to criminal suspects
or to those who defend them. This dynamic leads the critics to
characterize the system as chronically undernourished,144 but they
142. There is a difference in the source of financing for federal prosecutors and public
defenders: Congress funds prosecutors through allocations to the Department of Justice and
public defenders through appropriations for the federal judiciary. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 548
(2012) (federal prosecutors), with 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (federal defenders).
143. CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2012 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY 3-4 (2012) (noting that, "for each citizen's tax dollar, only two-tenths of one penny go
toward funding the entire third branch of government"), available at http://perma.cclF7NV-5T4J.
144. Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument from
Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 805 (2004) ("Indigent defense is widely
underfunded, and the political structures through which funding decisions are made suggest
little hope for improvement.").
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oversimplify the point. For once again, it is impossible to appraise the
nature of American criminal justice without some understanding of
the need for tradeoffs. Our Constitution has made a deep commitment
to both individual and democratic liberty, and the benefits that flow
from self-governance do not come without costs. Inevitably, citizens
assail democracy for its shortsightedness and small-mindedness, and
often they are right. But the criminal justice system has never existed
in a vacuum. It is part of a larger social context in which elected
officials are always going to play their part. And the criticism of
spending priorities and resource allocations that assertedly leave
criminal justice chronically shortchanged is often less a criticism of
the system than it is of democracy itself. The perfect world that brings
to our doorstep the fruits of democracy without its frustrations simply
does not exist.
Second, the indictment's claim that resource-deprived,
overworked public defenders are providing inadequate representation
for their clients is called into question by recent studies. These studies
show that the quality of a defendant's lawyer, relative to that of the
prosecutor, has little bearing on the outcome of the defendant's case.145
And even if the quality of defense counsel does make a significant
difference, at least one study suggests that public defenders are just
as competent and effective as prosecutors. 146 In one recent survey,
federal judges even rated the performance of federal public defenders
slightly better than that of their prosecutorial counterparts. 147 These
results confirm that the federal public-defender system "provides
competent legal services which not only fulfill the noble promise of
Gideon, but surpass it."148 Speaking anecdotally is no substitute for
studies and surveys, but for what it's worth, I have found the quality
of public-defender representation on appeal generally consistent and
often exceptionally good. While the federal public-defender system
obviously constitutes the gold standard, state systems, as one might
145. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner & Albert H. Yoon, What Judges Think of the Quality of
Legal Representation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 317, 320, 342 (2011) (finding that federal trial and
appellate judges and state appellate judges share the view that "different types of criminal
lawyer[s], including prosecutors, do not influence case outcomes significantly'); Jennifer Bennett
Shinall, Note, Slipping Away from Justice: The Effect of Attorney Skill on Trial Outcomes, 63
VAND. L. REV. 267, 269-70 (2010) (arguing that "[r]egardless of their skill, criminal defense
attorneys do not have a statistically significant effect on the verdict or sentencing outcomes," but
that the skill of prosecuting attorneys is more likely to influence trial outcomes).
146. See Posner & Yoon, supra note 145, at 325-26 (noting that in the study, federal judges
ranked public defenders highest, followed closely by prosecutors).
147. Id.
148. Parsons, supra note 136, at 839.
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expect, show greater variation. In some localities, state public-
defender offices are by any measure overburdened, and that is
particularly true with respect to misdemeanor cases. 149 But many
state systems also serve their clients well. In response to the above-
mentioned survey, state judges admittedly ranked retained counsel
higher than public defenders and court-appointed counsel, but the
judges' "perceived differences" in the quality of prosecutors and public
defenders "were small and not statistically significant." 50 Far from
denying indigent defendants effective assistance of counsel, public
defenders represent their clients, imperfectly to be sure, but often as
well and sometimes even better than prosecutors represent the public.
Whereas the indictment of the criminal justice system seems
strained in its condemnation of privately retained defense counsel and
public defenders, it may pack a bit more punch with respect to court-
appointed lawyers, who are said to lack significant criminal-defense
experience,1'1 to serve only reluctantly,152 and to receive inadequate
compensation.15 3 Even here, however, the indictment ignores the
significant variation among jurisdictions. Like their public-defender
counterparts, the lawyers who serve as court-appointed counsel in the
federal system are generally "highly qualified and well trained," with
a reputation for real competence.5 4 The federal system also requires
that court-appointed counsel have a meaningful amount of criminal-
defense experience.155 Finally, to portray court-appointed counsel as
unwilling conscripts is to disparage the many lawyers who volunteer
for service out of a sense of duty or calling-and at a significant
discount to their usual hourly rates. Appointment by a court to the
solemn task of indigent representation can be quite an honor and, for
younger attorneys especially, an opportunity for public service and a
chance to demonstrate both zeal and skill.
149. See, e.g., NAT'L ASS'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE:
THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA'S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 21 (2009), available at
http://perma.ccl7YRL-U5EU (alleging that, in the notorious case of New Orleans, "part-time
defenders are handling the equivalent of almost 19,000 cases per year per attorney, which
literally limits them to seven minutes per case").
150. Posner & Yoon, supra note 145, at 326 & nn.32-33.
151. Bright, supra note 16, at 7.
152. Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 21, at 93.
153. Id.
154. Margareth Etienne, The Declining Utility of the Right to Counsel in Federal Criminal
Courts: An Empirical Study on the Diminished Role of Defense Attorney Advocacy Under the
Sentencing Guidelines, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 425, 478 (2004).
155. For a list of the qualifications necessary to be a Criminal Justice Act panel attorney,
see CJA PANEL MEMBERSHIP PROTOCOL AND CRITERIA (2010), available at
http://perma.ccD7MK-4QXR.
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To be sure, we must recognize that some systems of court-
appointed counsel simply fail to provide indigent defendants with the
representation they deserve. Where these failures occur, it is
appropriate to take ameliorative steps, such as providing better
compensation and training for court-appointed counsel, and
promulgating more stringent criteria for who may serve in the first
place. In fact, a number of state legislatures have instituted precisely
these reforms.156 But even where reform is needed, it should take the
form of incremental improvement rather than wholesale revision. It
would be especially misguided to attempt reform through structural
class action litigation. 157 According to one recent report, such litigation
has "ended with inconsistent decisions and settlements."58 These
mixed results should come as no surprise, for courts are often not
empowered to make the budgetary and other policy decisions
necessary for improving the representation afforded by court-
appointed counsel. The case has simply not been made, moreover, that
the quality of defense counsel in this country is either generally poor
or responsible for wholesale miscarriages of justice that the criminal
justice system itself is powerless to correct. That is not to say that the
representation of defendants is all it should be in all places; it is not. It
is not to say all judicial rulings are flawless; they are not. But the
appropriate course is to identify those places and challenge those
rulings, taking pains to improve the particulars, while acknowledging
and preserving the many strengths of the American system of indigent
criminal defense.
C. Prosecutorial Discretion: The Overlooked Benefits
Given that the picture of criminal defense counsel is more
complex than critics suggest, what about the stereotypical image of
the prosecutor's office? Commentators have made much of the
allegedly unchecked power of the prosecutor, which they believe
remains dangerously inconsistent with our system of checks and
balances. For instance, Professor William Stuntz concluded that
156. See Backus & Marcus, supra note 122, at 1103-16 (discussing the legislative reforms
Texas, Georgia, Virginia, Washington, and Montana have undertaken in recent years to address
problems involving the right to counsel).
157. See, e.g., Cara H. Drinan, The National Right to Counsel Act: A Congressional Solution
to the Nation's Indigent Defense Crisis, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487, 487 (2010) (advocating "a new
federal cause of action that allows indigent defendants to seek equitable relief for systematic
Sixth Amendment violations").
158. William Glaberson, Suit over Legal Aid Advances in New York, N.Y. TIMES, May 7,
2010, at A20.
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"prosecutorial power is unchecked by law and, given its invisibility,
barely checked by politics."15 9  Existing safeguards against
prosecutorial misconduct are allegedly inadequate because the
Supreme Court has made it exceedingly difficult to gain access to
relevant internal information from a prosecutor's office or to challenge
a prosecutor's actions if evidence of misconduct does come to light. 160
And for decades, critics have also assailed the grand jury system,
arguing that grand juries are "the total captive of the prosecutor who,
if he is candid, will concede that he can indict anybody, at any time,
for almost anything, before any grand jury."161 These detractors argue
that unfettered prosecutorial discretion and the "relative absence of
efforts to standardize and regulate charging practices" 162 lead to
arbitrary charging decisions, often with an outsized impact on
minorities and the poor.163 Although observers generally do not allege
intentional racial or socioeconomic discrimination by prosecutors, they
consistently report that "the consideration of class- and race-neutral
factors in the prosecutorial process often produce[s] disparate results
along class and race lines."164
Many contemporary critiques of prosecutorial discretion center
on the substantive breadth of the criminal law.166 Under this theory,
the expansive scope of criminal law permits prosecutors, as a practical
matter, to "[c]hoos[e] what people need to be made into criminals, then
simply pick[ ] the laws necessary to make that happen."166
159. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 295 (2011).
160. E.g., ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR
127 (2007).
161. William J. Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 174,
174 (1973).
162. DAVIS, supra note 160, at 34.
163. Id. at 5; see also Drew S. Days, III, Race and the Federal Justice System: A Look at the
Issue of Selective Prosecution, 48 ME. L. REV. 179, 181-84 (1996) (arguing that "federal
prosecution practices should be the subject of ongoing research and review to ensure that they
are consistent with constitutional norms').
164. DAVIS, supra note 160, at 5; see also Gary Ford, The New Jim Crow: Male and Female,
South and North, from Cradle to Grave, Perception and Reality: Racial Disparity and Bias in
America's Criminal Justice System, 11 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 324, 348-50 (2010); Robert J.
Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 797 (2012) ("[I]mplicit racial attitudes and stereotypes
skew prosecutorial decisions in a range of racially biased ways.').
165. See, e.g., Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 717-
18 (2005) (discussing various ways in which the criminal law currently exceeds its legitimate
scope).
166. Radley Balko, The Power of the Prosecutor, http://perma.cc/E5HP-BF5D (huffingtonpost
.com, archived Mar. 12, 2014).
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Furthermore, overcharging,1 67 which includes the practice of
"stack[ing]" multiple charges for the same underlying conduct, 68 is
said to bring undue pressure to bear on defendants to plead away
their right to trial. Overcharging can also bring the feared mandatory
minimums into play and deprive judges of their traditional sentencing
discretion in the process.
This critique is overdone. It is odd that prosecutors should bear
the brunt of criticism for the expansion of substantive criminal law
that in some part is a response to the increasing sophistication of
criminal activity itself. For example, the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970169 (more commonly known as
"RICO"), gave law enforcement new tools to fight organized crime by
dramatically expanding the scope of illegal activity that the federal
government could prosecute. 170 And amidst increasing rates of
cybercrime,171 Congress recently made it easier for prosecutors to
bring charges against computer hackers and for victims of identity
theft to get restitution. 172
As for overcharging, what is charged must still be proven. And
if charges bring pressure on defendants, it is hard to see how it could
be otherwise, unless society gives up punishing the criminal offense.
There is a limit to the extent we can expect prosecutors to ignore laws
that they have a duty to enforce. American criminal codes are, after
all, democratic products, and the fact that some legal elites find them
unduly strict or expansive1 73 does not change the fact that they reflect
deep-seated popular norms and communal judgments of desert and
retribution. It will hardly do, therefore, to sketch stereotypical
portraits of stop-at-nothing prosecutors or to advocate norms of
behavior that separate prosecutors from the society of which they form
a part. The fact that prosecutors are cloaked with the awesome powers
167. See Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion
and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORD. L. REV. 851, 868 (1995).
168. Balko, supra note 166.
169. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2000), amended by U.S.A. Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
56, § 813, 115 Stat. 272, 382.
170. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922, 923.
171. See generally MCAFEE, A GOOD DECADE FOR CYBERCRIME (2011), available at
http://perma.cc/P8RX-RKH3.
172. Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-326, 122 Stat.
3560.
173. See Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 228-29
(2007); Balko, supra note 166 (arguing that we have too many federal criminal laws and that
many of them are too vaguely and broadly written).
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of government and serve as officers of the court 74 does, however,
suggest the need for restraint and balance in the exercise of their
discretion. Yet the coequal fact that prosecutors are advocates in an
adversary system suggests that they will-and should-pursue their
most lawless quarry with some zeal.
The critics simply ignore the benefits of prosecutorial
discretion, which, when used prudently, can deliver consistent results
that track the public's moral intuitions more closely than any
plausible alternative. It would be impossible for a criminal code to
spell out crimes and punishments to fit every conceivable scenario.175
It would thus be impractical to try to make the prosecutor's task
mechanical. Limits on prosecutorial resources require that some
crimes go unpunished so that prosecutors can attend to other, more
troubling ones.176 Not every violation of law merits pressing charges.
Prosecutors need the discretion to forego cases with slim evidentiary
foundations, those with mitigating circumstances, or those with
minimal adverse public consequences. In this sense, prosecutorial
discretion is an indispensable part of the front-loaded character of
American criminal justice. Because elected officials recognize that
inflexible rules can lead to unjust results and an unwise allocation of
prosecutorial time and energy, these officials properly delegate
substantial enforcement discretion to prosecutors and other actors.177
In any adversarial proceeding-civil or criminal-the party
filing suit has significant discretion as to the timing, forum, and legal
substance of the proceeding. Civil plaintiffs, if they choose to sue, may
generally pursue multiple theories of liability 78 and enjoy latitude as
to when and where they can bring suit.179 By the same token,
prosecutors, as first-moving parties in criminal proceedings, logically
174. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 n.33 (1976) (noting that drawing a proper
line between the prosecutor's functions as an administrator and an officer of the court may be
difficult).
175. Stephanos Bibas, The Need for Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L.
REV. 369, 372 (2010).
176. Katherine Barnes et al., Place Matters (Most): An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial
Decision-Making in Death-Eligible Cases, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 305, 314 (2009).
177. See Stuntz, supra note 33, at 546-57 (discussing the three basic ways prosecutorial
discretion helps reinforce the relationship between legislators and prosecutors in shaping
criminal law).
178. See, e.g., Golden v. Den-Mat Corp., 276 P.3d 773, 785 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that
a "plaintiff may advance multiple theories of liability," "may assert some available theories but
not others," and "may pick and choose at his or her discretion so long as the defendant has been
fairly apprised of the circumstances").
179. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012) (diversity jurisdiction); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,
454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981) ("[A] plaintiff s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.").
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have discretion as to (1) whether to bring charges in the first place, (2)
what charges to bring, and (3) whether those charges should be
brought in state court, federal court, or both. Discretion allows a civil
plaintiff to sue the negligent driver who caused a serious accident
while speeding but excuse the teenager who caused a fender bender on
the way home from obtaining a learner's permit. All parties involved
might be better off if the second incident does not lead to a lawsuit.
The same reasoning applies in the criminal context: discretion allows
a district attorney to throw the book at a seasoned burglar arrested
during a home invasion but refrain from prosecuting a disabled youth
for a minor shoplifting offense.
As with any delegation of power, there is a risk that
prosecutors will abuse their authority to decide which cases deserve
prosecution. The abuse can occur in several ways-in undertaking
questionable prosecutions, in declining to prosecute hard cases out of
laziness or timidity, or in acting from partisan or political purposes
extrinsic to the case itself. Attorney General Robert H. Jackson
famously stated, "While the prosecutor at his best is one of the most
beneficent forces in society, when he acts from malice or other base
motives, he is one of the worst." 80
Once again the need for some tradeoff is apparent. Recognizing
both the potential for prosecutorial misconduct 8 and the chilling
effect of judicial intrusion into the prosecutorial sphere, the Supreme
Court has struck the balance in favor of prosecutorial independence. It
has fashioned doctrines of prosecutorial immunity that largely
insulate prosecutors from retaliatory lawsuits by defendants, while
still prohibiting truly arbitrary prosecutions.182 As the Court has often
noted, if prosecutors were subject to suit by those who believe they
were wrongly accused, too many of the prosecutor's resources "would
180. Att'y Gen. Robert H. Jackson, U.S. Dep't of Justice, The Federal Prosecutor (Apr. 1,
1940), in 24 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y 18, 18-20 (1940).
181. E.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) ('There is no doubt that the
breadth of discretion that our country's legal system vests in prosecuting attorneys carries with
it the potential for both individual and institutional abuse.").
182. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463-71 (1996) (holding that to
establish entitlement to discovery on a claim of selective prosecution based on race, the
defendant must produce credible evidence that similarly situated defendants of other races could
have been prosecuted, but were not); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985)
(holding that prosecutorial discretion is broad but not unfettered, as it is subject to constitutional
constraints); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-31 (1976) (holding that a prosecutor who
acted within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a prosecution was absolutely
immune from civil suits for damages for alleged deprivations of the accused's constitutional
rights).
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be diverted from the pressing duty of enforcing the criminal law."1 83
Perhaps worse, "[t]he public trust of the prosecutor's office would
suffer if he were constrained in making every decision by the
consequences in terms of his own potential liability in a suit for
damages."184 As a result, the Court has consistently approved of broad
prosecutorial discretion,185 and prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity
from suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 related to charging decisions. 86 The
Court has acknowledged that "[absolute] immunity does leave the
genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress against a
prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of
liberty."187 But the Justices have concluded that the alternative-
providing only qualified immunity to prosecutors-"would prevent the
vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor's duty that is
essential to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system." 88
Notwithstanding absolute prosecutorial immunity, criminal
defendants facing arbitrary prosecution are not wholly without
remedy. Like all government action, prosecutorial discretion is still
circumscribed by our Constitution, and "the decision to prosecute may
not be 'deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race,
religion, or other arbitrary classification. "189 Selective prosecution
claims are governed by "ordinary equal protection standards,"190
meaning that prosecutions intentionally targeting particular racial or
religious groups are effectively forbidden. If a defendant can show that
she was prosecuted because she was a certain race or religion, for
instance, the charges will not stand.'9' The prospect of redress against
discriminatory prosecution, however, covers but a tiny sliver of hard-
to-prove instances; it still leaves the problem of the baseless
accusation hanging.
So what checks are there? Our criminal justice system has only
the limited checks of potential media scrutiny and political
accountability for prosecutors who for whatever reason fail to
prosecute those who deserve to be charged. U.S. Attorney Rudolph
Giuliani may have been grandstanding when he prosecuted the heads
183. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 425.
184. Id. at 424-25.
185. E.g., Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607.
186. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427-28.
187. Id. at 427.
188. Id. at 427-28.
189. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608 (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)).
190. Id.
191. See id. at 608-09 (citing Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
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of New York City's five major organized-crime families in the
Southern District of New York, 192 but that is the kind of work we
expect well-resourced prosecutors to roll up their sleeves and do. What
of those who fail to do so? It is always tempting for prosecutors to
pursue cases that are easy to work up or easy to prove-to pick only
low-hanging fruit. But the larger threats to social well-being may well
involve sustained and even dangerous work. Are these cases
overlooked? Such acts of omission are notoriously difficult to detect.
What of errors of commission: the unfounded prosecution? Here
the cumulative safeguards against prosecutorial abuse are somewhat
greater. Judges, juries, and defense counsel possess, each in
distinctive ways, the capacity to call prosecutorial abuses to account.
Prosecutors, especially those subject to periodic elections, 193 may also
be reluctant to engage in behavior that might draw negative media
attention. Losing cases, moreover, is not a way to enhance one's
reputation or a strategy for winning votes.194 The problems with these
supposed checks are, of course, threefold: plea bargaining largely
takes place under the electoral radar, federal prosecutors are not
elected at all, and even a trial that results in acquittal or a case that is
dismissed prior to trial can damage a defendant's reputation and put
him through needless trauma and expense. So while checks on
prosecutorial abuses do exist, they are imperfect ones.
And yet here, once again, there is a tradeoff. The advantages of
prosecutorial discretion are considerable, and the cures remain far
worse than the disease. Efforts to enhance the scrutiny of the grand
jury may sound fine in theory, but in practice they risk creating a trial
before the trial. Other reforms have drawbacks too. The American
legal regime is an adversarial one, and bringing judges into
prosecutorial decisions would undermine its essential character.
Adding layers of external review prior to prosecution would bring a
cumbersomeness and contentiousness all its own, with no assurance
that repetitive scrutiny would add the slightest measure of justice or
wisdom to the decisional mix. Expanding the scope of civil damages
actions for ill-founded prosecutions would implicate the Supreme
192. See Arnold H. Lubasch, U.S. Jury Convicts Eight as Members of Mob Commission, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 1986, available at http://perma.cc/3932-FZM5.
193. Over ninety-five percent of county- and municipal-level chief prosecutors are subject to
popular election. Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 717, 734 (1996). Others are generally appointed by elected officials, making them
indirectly accountable to the electorate.
194. Meghan J. Ryan, Remedying Wrongful Execution, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 261, 274-75
(2012).
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Court's concern of a chilling effect on well-founded prosecutions.195
Creating civilian review boards to evaluate prosecutorial decisions
after the fact 96 is another bad, bog-the-system-down idea. Such
outside reviewers might themselves be highly polarized and lack the
experience that prosecutorial offices develop by working through many
cases over many years. And these review boards often would not
possess the essential democratic legitimacy that comes from the
prosecutor's status as a public representative in court, with direct or
indirect electoral accountability. Finally, as discussed above, a
mechanical set of rules is simply not an adequate substitute for the
discretion of a competent prosecutor: who does and does not deserve to
face charges is both science and art.
Many reforms, then, would have the effect of disabling the
system. Some guidance of the right sort may nonetheless be valuable.
The President, through the Attorney General, sets the prosecutorial
priorities of the Department of Justice, including the ninety-three U.S.
Attorney's Offices ("USAOs"). Recently, examples of the lenient
exercise of centralized prosecutorial discretion surfaced prominently.
Attorney General Eric Holder announced that "certain drug offenders"
would "no longer be charged with offenses that 'impose draconian
mandatory minimum sentences' "197 and that some undocumented
immigrants who meet several requirements and "are younger than 30"
would be eligible for "deferred action" from prosecution for two
years.198
Such centralized direction involving broad classes of cases are
not typical, however, of the more individualized determinations made
by federal and state prosecutors every day. At the federal level, many
195. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427-28 (1976) (stating that subjecting
prosecutors to liability for error or mistaken judgment in prosecution would disserve the public
interest by preventing "the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor's duty that is
essential to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system," and noting that "various post-
trial procedures are available to determine whether an accused has received a fair trial.").
196. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the
Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 463 (2001) (arguing that "Congress and state
legislatures should pass legislation establishing Prosecution Review Boards," the purpose of
which "would be to review complaints and conduct random reviews of prosecution decisions to
deter misconduct and arbitrary decision-making").
197. Dan Merica & Evan Perez, Eric Holder Seeks to Cut Mandatory Minimum Drug
Sentences, http://perma.cc/3H59-69EQ (cnn.com, archived Mar. 12, 2014).
198. Rebekah Metzler, Obama Offers Two Years of 'Deferred Action' to Illegal Immigrants,
http://perma.cc/ANA4-BTKX (usnews.com, archived Mar. 12, 2014). The Attorney General's
announcement presented an intriguing problem. The executive branch clearly possesses the
power of prosecutorial discretion. The legislative branch just as clearly possesses the power to
prescribe crimes and punishments. See infra Section IV.A. Query whether a blanket refusal to
charge certain statutes or seek certain penalties impermissibly nullifies valid legislative acts.
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of the baseline criteria are set out in the U.S. Attorney's Manual, a set
of internal guidelines issued by the Department. 199 The Department
has supplemented the general guidelines of the Manual with statute-
specific guidelines, many of which are collected in the Criminal
Resource Manual. 200 Thus, to take but one example, the Department
has issued detailed "prosecutive screening criteria"201 to guide U.S.
Attorneys bringing prosecutions for violations of the Child Support
Recovery Act of 1992.202
The extent of the Department's control over the discretion of
individual U.S. Attorneys is a matter of debate. Professor Dan Kahan,
for instance, has argued that the "strong history and culture of
independence" of U.S. Attorneys make them only "nominally
subordinate to the Attorney General."203 Others, however, contend
that the Department has substantial influence over individual U.S.
Attorneys, given their reliance on Washington for later judicial and
political appointments, and given the fragmented nature of local
political elites.204 Within the individual USAOs, Assistant U.S.
Attorneys do not go unsupervised, but they also tend to enjoy broad
prosecutorial discretion. Whether this is due to their increasing length
of tenure, the growth of civil service protections, or some other factor
is difficult to say.205
More formal internal policies for the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion would seem to hold especial promise in state systems where
"[u]se of general written guidelines is sporadic" and "[t]here is
199. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL (1997) [hereinafter USA
Manual]. See generally Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing
"Discretionary Justice", 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 167, 170-75 (2004) (providing an overview
of the U.S. Attorneys' Manual). Unlike agency regulations, courts have consistently treated the
Manual as purely internal policy and have refused to give remedies for individual-prosecutor
violations of it. See id. at 177.
200. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL (1997).
201. Memorandum from the Office of the Attorney General to all United States Attorneys,
Prosecutive Guidelines and Procedures for the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992 (Feb. 25,
1997), available at http://perma.cclG93E-4SUJ. See generally Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial
Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 893, 949-52 (2000) (explaining the prosecutorial screening criteria).
202. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2012).
203. Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARv. L. REV. 469,
486 (1996).
204. See Todd Lochner, Strategic Behavior and Prosecutorial Agenda Setting in United
States Attorneys' Offices: The Role of U.S. Attorneys and Their Assistants, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 271,
279-81 (2002) (discussing incentives for U.S. Attorneys to align themselves with the Department
of Justice).
205. See id. at 281-84, 287-88 (discussing the impact of the recent trend of Assistant U.S.
Attorneys' careerism).
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typically no regularized or substantial training at the start of a
prosecutor's career."206 But efforts to subject prosecutorial discretion to
substantial external or post hoc review will only weigh down and
bureaucratize the entire process. Indeed, related concerns with
efficiency and limited resource capacity-especially surrounding the
implementation of drug policy207-have been an important driver in
increasing prosecutorial discretion in continental European countries,
long considered jurisdictions with limited or even nonexistent
prosecutorial discretion.208 Guidelines and training within the
executive branch itself hold forth the promise of channeling discretion
and achieving some consistency and uniformity among jurisdictions.
To go beyond that is to risk the sacrifice of a system that
produces more than its share of individually humane restraint and
collectively protective action. The critics harp on cases they rightly or
wrongly feel should not be brought. They frequently have little
interest in discovering the myriad instances of mature judgment that
result in decisions not to charge or to overcharge, and not to seek the
limits of permissible punishment. Is prosecutorial discretion perfect?
Heavens no. But the suggested substitutes for the most part present
the prospect of ceaseless wrangling or interminable decision by
committee that will bring what is, after all, only the initial step in the
criminal justice system to a slow crawl or virtual stop. The Framers
understood the virtues of collective external deliberation in criminal
justice when they provided for grand and petit juries. That they did
not go further should give great pause to those who would.
D. Plea Bargaining: The Pluses
Even more abominable than prosecutorial discretion, the critics
claim, is plea bargaining. Despite its ubiquity, or perhaps because of
it, the common refrain condemns plea bargaining as an evil wrought
by a regime overburdened with charged cases. The combined effects of
206. Ronald F. Wright & Marc L. Miller, The Worldwide Accountability Deficit for
Prosecutors, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1587, 1608-09 (2010).
207. See Marianne Wade, Prosecutors and Drugs Policy: A Tale of Six European Systems,
2009 UTAH L. REV. 153, 169 (discussing the trend in Europe towards increased prosecutorial
discretion in relation to drug offenses).
208. John H. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78 MICH. L.
REV. 204 (1979). For arguments that prosecutors in continental European countries enjoy
substantial discretion, see generally Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1413 (2010); Yue Ma, Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Bargaining in the
United States, France, Germany, and Italy: A Comparative Perspective, 12 INT'L CRIM. JUST. REV.
22 (2002).
1138 [Vol. 67:4:1099
2014] IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1139
the profusion of possible charges and the increasing length of
sentences allow prosecutors to pressure defendants to proclaim guilt-
rightly or wrongly-in order to avoid what amounts to barbaric
punishment. 209 Likewise, many view the prosecutorial tendency to pile
count upon count as mere posturing meant to punish people for
claiming the practical and constitutional protections underlying a
thorough investigation and trial.210 By thus restricting judicial
oversight, the prosecutor "combines both executive and judicial
power-posing the very danger the Framers tried to prevent."211 Even
worse, the story goes, because bargaining behavior is a complex
psychological phenomenon that varies enormously with individual
circumstances, allowing negotiation over pleas ultimately promotes
punishment based on such improper factors as "wealth, sex, age,
education, intelligence, and confidence." 212 Simply put, plea
bargaining permits conniving prosecutors to browbeat naive-and
often innocent-defendants into signing away their rights, freedoms,
and reputations without adequate inquiry or process. 213 As with the
portrayal of criminal defense representation and prosecutorial
discretion, however, this indictment suffers from inaccuracies,
hyperbole, and a refusal to grapple with the question of alternatives.
Numerous flaws undercut the vilification of plea bargaining.
First, the criminal justice system incorporates multiple safeguards to
ensure that defendants enjoy a meaningful choice. The Supreme Court
insists that guilty pleas be intelligent and voluntary to satisfy due
process, 214 and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure reinforce this
requirement. 215 They require courts to inform defendants in open court
of the rights they are waiving and the charges and penalties they are
facing; in short, all the things that would promote maximum
awareness both of choices and consequences. Those who dismiss such
proceedings as mere ritual meant to ratify done deals simply beg the
question of whether the deal gave both parties something of what they
want. Defendants have a constitutional right to effective legal
209. See Wright & Miller, supra note 39, at 33-34 (discussing the use of overcharging by
prosecutors to pressure defense attorneys to convince their clients, even those that are innocent,
to accept plea bargains in order to avoid the substantial risk of greater punishment).
210. See Bibas, supra note 44, at 1383-85; Scott & Stuntz, supra note 41, at 1912.
211. Barkow, supra note 31, at 1048.
212. Bibas, supra note 43, at 2468.
213. See supra notes 38-40, 210-13 and accompanying text.
214. Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 81 (2004); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
215. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b) (requiring courts to apprise defendants of their right to trial and
other procedural protections before accepting guilty pleas, which the court must ensure are
voluntary and factually supported).
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representation during plea negotiations, 216 and these attorneys can be
strong bargaining agents for several reasons. Defense counsel are
often repeat players with broad knowledge of customary court
practices. 217 Moreover, "When the defense attorney represents a real
live human being and has a strictly adversarial responsibility, and the
prosecutor represents the highly amorphous concept of 'the public
interest,' the plea process tends to yield favorable results for the more
adversarial participant."218
Complementing protections specific to the plea bargaining
process are structural safeguards provided by the shadow of trial
itself. Ultimately, plea deals are roughly as fair as the trials they
foreclose because the threat of trial pervades the entire process. 219
Both sides bring chips to the bargaining table: "The defendant has the
right to plead not guilty and force the prosecutor to prove the case at
trial," and the "prosecutor has the right to seek the maximum
sentence for the maximum offense that can be proven." 220 Under
certain conditions, it may prove mutually beneficial to exchange these
entitlements. 22 1 Of particular advantage to the accused, prosecutors
may be hesitant to try flimsy cases because of the reputational harm
accompanying litigation losses (among other, perhaps nobler
concerns) 222  and may therefore offer generous compromises.
Altogether, both sides make decisions based on the expected outcome
of a highly regulated trial incorporating its own share of defendant-
216. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405-08 (2012).
217. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 41, at 1922-23.
218. Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 67.
219. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD.
289, 309-17 (1983) (detailing the tradeoff between prosecutors and defendants in plea
bargaining); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (examining the impact of the legal system on divorce
negotiations and bargaining); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 41, at 1910 (explaining the different
opinions about plea bargaining). More recently, Professor Stephanos Bibas has put forth
arguments that the shadow-of-trial model is outdated and oversimplified. Bibas, supra note 43,
at 2468. At base, though, Bibas does not reject the model as a whole but rather suggests
"practicable solutions that bring plea bargains more into line ... with trial shadows," such as
"smoothly graded sentencing guidelines and better discovery" aimed at "reduc[ing] the influence
of uncertainty on bargaining without creating lumpiness." Id. at 2469.
220. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 41, at 1914. The Supreme Court has explicitly endorsed the
presumption of equal bargaining power on the part of both parties. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434
U.S. 357, 363 (1978).
221. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 41, at 1914.
222. See Ryan, supra note 194, at 274-75 ("Prosecutors have a professional incentive to
obtain convictions because prosecutors' offices often emphasize conviction rates and tie these to a
prosecutor's professional advancement.").
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friendly safeguards. 223 "Thus, the jury is not controlling merely the
immediate case . . . but the host of cases . . . which are destined to be
disposed of by the pre-trial process."224
The shadow of trial also diminishes the specter of an innocent
man copping a plea. Blameless defendants "have reason to believe
that they are less likely to be convicted" at trial and are thus less
likely to plead guilty.22 5 The requirement that courts assure
themselves that guilty pleas possess a factual basis further
undermines the attempt to discredit the plea bargaining system with
the specter of innocents pleading guilty. 226
Though plea bargaining has long been recognized as a form of
contract,227 a comparison of the protections governing plea discussions
and other negotiations proves illuminating. For instance, unlike the
cryptic terms and conditions hidden within standardized contracts of
adhesion, the language in plea bargains is typically clearer and more
comprehensible. Moreover, commercial consumers faced with fine-
print disclaimers are not guaranteed effective legal representation.2 2 8
Finally, a criminal defendant may enjoy superior bargaining power. A
prosecutor aiming to avoid the time and expense of trial has far
greater incentive to engage in individualized negotiations than does a
company serving a multitude of consumers. 229 Put simply, the plea
bargaining system invests defendants with a number of advantages
foreign to contract law's normal terrain.
Faced with this dynamic, it is cynical to contend plea
bargaining is corrupt. Far more often than not, agreements represent
nothing more and nothing less than the best deal a lawyer can get for
his client. That is the essence of what law is about. Belying the critics'
despair, the benefits of plea bargaining are manifold. The Supreme
Court has extolled a variety of the practice's positive effects, including
not only the obvious efficiency gains reaped by prosecutors and the
223. See Guidorizzi, supra note 119, at 769 (quoting Alissa Pollitz Worden, Policymaking by
Prosecutors: The Uses of Discretion in Regulating Plea Bargaining, 73 JUDICATURE 335, 336
(1990)) ('The 'rigorous standards of due process and proof imposed during trials' do not become
irrelevant with plea bargaining but, in fact, influence the nature of the bargain reached.").
224. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 31-32 (1966).
225. Timothy Sandefur, In Defense of Plea Bargaining, REG., Fall 2003, at 28, 31.
226. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3) ("Before entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must
determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.").
227. See, e.g., Scott & Stuntz, supra note 41 (using contract theory to evaluate plea
bargaining).
228. Id. at 1922.
229. Id. at 1924.
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judiciary230 but also the societal gains produced by criminals'
forthright admissions of guilt. 23 1 Observers note that plea bargaining
serves the interests of crime victims as well by providing "an
immediate sense of closure along with the knowledge that the
defendant will not go unpunished for the crime."232 It also allows
victims (and witnesses) to avoid the rigors-and sometimes the
horror-of reliving the crime scene in open court.
The benefits of plea bargaining flow equally to the defense.
Problems allocating scarce resources plague public defenders just as
much, if not more, than prosecutors. 233 Bringing losing cases to an
efficient conclusion allows them to focus greater attention on more
demanding or deserving matters-perhaps involving innocent
defendants. And because even private defense counsel often earn
relatively small fees, plea bargaining may provide the only path "to
adequately represent [their] client[s] and still make a living"-and for
the criminal defense bar to continue attracting talented attorneys. 234
As for defendants themselves, those convicted at trial "had no right to
leniency" in the first place, rendering the ability to bargain beforehand
a welcome boon.235 Even beyond concrete charge and sentencing
concessions, defendants reap abstract benefits like "avoid[ing] ... the
anxieties and uncertainties of a trial."236 Candid defense counsel
concede the accuracy of this assessment. Defense attorney and
Georgetown law professor Abbe Smith contends that plea bargaining
is "a critical part of defense lawyering" because pleading guilty often
serves a defendant's best interests.237 Plea bargaining is "not our
favorite part," she admits, "I'd much rather go to trial. Going to trial is
230. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971) (noting that plea
bargaining helps prosecutors and the judiciary deal with their heavy workload by leading to the
prompt and "largely final disposition of most criminal cases").
231. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970):
[W]e cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the State to extend a benefit to a
defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to the State and who
demonstrates by his plea that he is ready and willing to admit his crime and to enter
the correctional system in a frame of mind that affords hope for success in
rehabilitation over a shorter period of time than might otherwise be necessary.
232. Guidorizzi, supra note 119, at 767.
233. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84
YALE L.J. 1179, 1206-55 (1975) (describing a variety of public defenders' advantages and
disadvantages in the plea bargaining system); see also supra Part III.B (discussing the effects of
resource constraints on public defenders).
234. Guidorizzi, supra note 223, at 766.
235. Sandefur, supra note 225, at 30.
236. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).
237. Interview by Ofra Bikel with Abbe Smith, Professor, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. (Jan.
30, 2004), available at http://perma.cclJ2KG-7DYH.
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fun."238 But, she concludes, "I'm not the one that's doing the time; my
clients are doing the time. . . . [T]he only regrets I have as a lawyer are
the instances in which I think I didn't lean hard enough on a client to
take a plea."239
In sum, plea bargaining is "not only an essential part of the
[criminal justice] process but a highly desirable part," as the Supreme
Court has declared. 240 The critics simply fail to articulate how the
criminal justice system could function in the absence of this much-
maligned feature. Would those who bemoan the existence of plea
bargaining actually welcome forcing all criminal defendants to go to
trial? Individuals are-and should remain-free to relinquish the
right to a jury trial when waiver is in their best interests. To constrain
the autonomy of the accused in this context would disregard, rather
than respect, fundamental liberties.241 Curtailing plea bargaining
would also threaten disastrous consequences for the broader criminal
justice system. For example, assuming constant resource levels,
limiting pretrial negotiation would almost certainly lead to a dramatic
surge in the number of trials.242 In order to cope with the systemic
pressure of the multitude of new trials, courts would need to pare back
their length and scope, resulting in the curtailment of rights and an
increase in the rate of false convictions. 243
A healthy dose of realism would do advocates of reform a great
deal of good. Attempts to ban plea bargaining outright will likely
prove futile because of the survival of "implicit plea bargaining,"
whereby defendants plead guilty in expectation of lighter sentences
even without expressly securing concessions from the state.244 The
most well-known experiment in eliminating plea bargaining produced
mixed results and was ultimately abandoned, seemingly at least in
part for this reason.245 The Supreme Court has noted the specter of
black-market bargaining, counseling that a "rigid constitutional rule
that would prohibit a prosecutor from acting forthrightly in his
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971).
241. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1976
(1992) (arguing that defendants' should have the right to negotiate a plea deal and regulating
plea deals infringes on the defendant's liberty).
242. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 41, at 1950.
243. Id.
244. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Plea Bargaining in Historical Perspective, 13 LAw & Soc'Y
REV. 247, 247 (1979) (describing implicit plea bargaining).
245. See Guidorizzi, supra note 119, at 775-77 (discussing Alaska's experience between 1975
and 1993).
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dealings with the defense could only invite unhealthy subterfuge that
would drive the practice of plea bargaining back into the shadows."246
The system is only as good as the people who comprise it. The
abler the negotiators, the better the plea bargaining. No amount of
systemic restructuring can rescue indifferent lawyering. It is always
possible, of course, to propose improvements in any process. Plea
agreements should generally be memorialized in writing prior to court
approval.247 And certainly, the presence of more prosecutors and
public defenders will diminish the danger that high volume will lead
negotiators to shortchange the individual case or cause defendants to
get lost in the shuffle.
The fact that the prosecution or defense may feel pressures to
reach a deal, however, does not mean the process is an involuntary
one. External circumstances bear down on negotiations all the time.
The state of the battlefield influences the negotiations on a treaty. The
state of parties' respective finances affects the negotiations of a
commercial contract. The parties' resources pressure negotiators in a
civil case to settle. The severity of the crime and strength of the
evidence affects plea bargaining. Such entirely ordinary pressures are
simply not tantamount to coercion.248 That one may have an incentive
to come to terms does not mean that one is forced to do so.
In the end, plea bargaining affords yet another example of the
varied benefits that a criminal justice system with front-end emphasis
can deliver. The plea bargaining process, buttressed by counsel during
negotiations and by the involvement of judges in plea hearings,
enhances-not diminishes-human freedom. Given that society is not
just going to let those who offend its criminal laws go free, liberty is
best preserved by letting defendants leverage what they have.249 Both
the volume of cases and the variation in legal capabilities will always
be with us, to a greater or lesser degree. The amelioration of those
conditions is desirable; the assault on a system with as many virtues
as plea bargaining is not.
246. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978).
247. See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to
Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1151-60 (2011) (suggesting procedural statutory
reforms based on consumer protection laws).
248. See, e.g., Scott & Stuntz, supra note 41, at 1920-21 ("A large sentencing differential
does not imply coercion a priori. Rather, it is entirely consistent with the assumption that the
right to take the case to trial is a valuable entitlement.").
249. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 241, at 1971 (arguing that a "good part of the practice
of many defense lawyers, especially in the period before indictment, is supplying information to
prosecutors" and, because "[p]rosecutors take seriously information coming from reputable
counsel," they will be less likely to conflate the guilty and the innocent).
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IV. THE DEMOCRATIC VIRTUES OF OUR CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Once we realize that the picture of criminal adjudications is far
more complex than the critics suggest, we can better understand the
democratic virtues of the American criminal justice system. One of the
chief features of that system is its receptivity to popular input. Of
course, a system of justice can go too far in this direction. A lynching
at the hands of a mob has popular participation, but no one would
claim the proceeding bore the slightest resemblance to justice. Liberty,
in short, is not a matter of popular sufferance. On the other hand, few
things affect the public safety and ordered society so much as the
system of criminal justice, and it is only right that such a public
institution not become the instrument of unaccountable elites. Where
to strike the balance between popular participation and insulation
from popular excess is not an easy question. If the American system
sometimes errs on the side of democratization, that is not always a
bad thing.
A. Democratic Control over Crime and Punishment
The practice of entrusting legislatures with control over crime
and punishment-an approach that commentators have referred to as
"legislative primacy"250-may seem so commonplace today that its
basic features may be taken for granted. But it is only upon
understanding the contours of our current system that we can
properly respond to its detractors. This Section therefore begins with
a brief account of the way in which legislative primacy functions,
examining a typical criminal statute by way of example.
Broadly speaking, legislatures set about their task of defining
crime and punishment by enacting criminal statutes that share two
features: the elements of a criminal offense and a range of
punishments. Consider the criminal offense of burglary. The states
have defined burglary using statutes that differ in their various
details, but California's burglary law, first enacted in 1872 and
amended periodically since then, serves as a useful example. Section
459 of the California Penal Code provides the core prohibition: "Every
person who enters any house, room, apartment, tenement, shop,
warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse or other building, tent,
vessel [or other specified space] with intent to commit grand or petit
250. See Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96
MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1301 (1998); Robert Weisberg & Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Lessons, 58
STAN. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005).
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larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary."251 The California
legislature has thus defined the elements of burglary in section 459 to
include (1) entry into a specified space, with (2) the intent to commit
larceny or any felony.252 The California legislature then sets forth a
range of punishments for burglary. Section 460 provides that "every
burglary of an inhabited dwelling house" is "burglary of the first
degree," whereas "other kinds of burglary are of the second degree." 253
Section 461 explains that burglary in the first degree is punishable by
a term of "imprisonment in state prison for two, four, or six years,"
while burglary in the second degree is punishable by "imprisonment in
the county jail not exceeding one year."254
That legislatures are responsible for defining crimes and
attendant punishments in this manner should not be taken to mean
that our system of criminal law is altogether subject to the will of
democratic majorities. Judges apply constitutional checks at
sentencing, albeit not as strictly as at trial. In invalidating on Eighth
Amendment grounds the imposition of mandatory life sentences on
juvenile homicide offenders, 255 the Supreme Court summed up this
judicial check as follows: although "[t]he definition of the elements of a
criminal offense is entrusted to the legislature," the legislature must
still act "within any applicable constitutional constraints in defining
criminal offenses." 256 Judges possess considerable discretion in the
conduct of a criminal trial on everything from jury selection,
evidentiary rulings, continuances, scope of cross-examination, and
much more. Their discretion at sentencing is even greater: the finding
of facts and imposition of punishment within prescribed limits are
both entrusted to their care. Deciding who gets to define the contours
of criminal law is, in other words, not a stark either-or proposition
between lawmakers and judges. Yet when it comes to deciding what
primary social conduct shall be criminally proscribed in the first
instance and how it shall be punished, our system locates that power
squarely in the hands of elected legislatures.
251. CAL. PENAL CODE § 459 (West 2014).
252. People v. Anderson, 211 P.3d 584, 589 (Cal. 2009).
253. CAL. PENAL CODE § 460. The statute also provides that burglary of a vessel, floating
home, or trailer coach qualifies as burglary in the first degree.
254. Id. § 461.
255. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (holding that statutes that
impose mandatory life imprisonment without possibility of parole for juvenile homicide offenders
violate Eighth Amendment).
256. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 & n.6 (1985).
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It was not inevitable that this would be so. We could have had
a system in which judges and not lawmakers define crimes and
punishments through the process of adjudication. Indeed, American
criminal law often followed this kind of approach, as crimes were
defined as a matter of judge-made common law. 25 7 Until they enacted
statutes defining the elements of burglary, for instance, the states
enforced the common-law version of the offense, which encompassed
additional judicially created elements such as the requirement that
the offense occur during nighttime.258
As it turns out, criticisms of the common-law system of crime
and punishment are largely responsible for the most widely cited
examples of the second alternative to legislative primacy: placing
responsibility for setting criminal law in independent bodies of
experts. At the heart of critiques against the criminal common-law
system were concerns with notice, since a regime of common-law
crimes "unfairly burden[s] the populace by subjecting it to prohibitions
of which it [i]s unaware."259 A movement thus developed towards
expert-drafted comprehensive codes setting forth entire bodies of
criminal law.2 6 0 The most prominent example was the American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code, which was drafted by a distinguished
committee of "law professors, judges, lawyers, and prison officials, as
well as experts from the fields of psychiatry, criminology, and even
257. See Note, Common Law Crimes in the United States, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1332, 1332
(1947) (observing in 1947 that a "majority of the states retains to some degree the common law of
crimes received as part of the common law of England" and that those common law concepts and
precedents "exert an influence much more pervasive than that found in code states"). To this day,
some states still have statutes on the books that expressly recognize the existence of a small
number of common-law crimes where parallel statutory provisions have not been enacted. See,
e.g., D.C. CODE § 49-301 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.01 (West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-3
(West 2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.04.060 (West 2013). The judicial power to create new
crimes in these states, however, is "rarely used." Kevin C. McMunigal, A Statutory Approach to
Criminal Law, 48 ST. LOUIs U. L.J. 1285, 1287 (2004).
258. See, e.g., Schwabacher v. People, 46 N.E. 809, 810 (Ill. 1897) (noting that the Illinois
burglary statute repealed the original common-law nighttime requirement); Carrier v. State, 89
N.E.2d 74, 76 (Ind. 1949) (same for Indiana law).
259. Ben Rosenberg, The Growth of Federal Criminal Common Law, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 193,
197 (2002); see also, e.g., COMMISSIONERS OF THE CODE, DRAFr OF A PENAL CODE FOR THE STATE
OF NEW YORK, at iv (1864) ("As long as the criminality of acts is left to depend upon the
uncertain definition or conflicting authorities of the common law, uncertainty must pervade our
criminal jurisprudence.").
260. See Sanford H. Kadish, Codifiers of the Criminal Law: Wechsler's Predecessors, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 1098, 1098-99 (1978) (discussing Herbert Wechsler's role in writing the Model
Penal Code as the "latest in a tradition of Anglo-American criminal law codifiers going back to
Jeremy Bentham").
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English literature."2 61 The Code was completed in 1962 and spurred
action by some thirty-four states, which adopted revised codes
between 1963 and 1982.262 Professor Stuntz cites the Code as the
prime example of "shift[ing] crime definition from elected legislators to
unelected experts or bureaucrats." 263
To be sure, this "shifting" of responsibility does not eliminate
the role of legislatures entirely; even after an independent body
completes its delegated task of drafting a code, the legislature must
still adopt it. And in the years since the states first adopted revised
codes, many have returned to the familiar approach of legislative
primacy where legislatures define and redefine crime and ranges of
punishment as part of the ordinary political process. 264 This
reemergence of a more robust legislative role led Herbert Wechsler to
complain that the New York criminal code, "which [he believed] in
1965 ... was a really quite distinguished integrated code, has been
slopped up. That's going to happen in every state in the union."2 65 But
the experience with the Model Penal Code teaches that the act of
placing the drafting pen in the hands of independent experts is a
distinct alternative to pure legislative primacy, as such delegation
assertedly has a "depoliticizing" effect that may lead to crimes and
punishments different than those lawmakers would otherwise
enact. 266
Understanding the concept of legislative primacy over criminal
law along with its potential alternatives allows us to better appreciate
the criticisms levied against it. The critics present two essential
charges. First, they argue that state legislatures and Congress have
simply enacted too many criminal prohibitions. Commentators decry
the "one-way ratchet" towards criminalizing more and more conduct,
with one professor likening the overcriminalization problem to "an
261. Paul H. Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A Brief
Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319, 323 (2007); see also Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of
Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 943, 948 (1999) ("The project got
underway at the beginning of our fifty-year period and, assisted by cadres of legal and social
science scholars, the Reporters submitted their final product in 1962.").
262. Kadish, supra note 261, at 948.
263. Stuntz, supra note 33, at 582.
264. See, e.g., id. at 582-84 (arguing that many states did not adopt the Model Penal Code
as drafted, but instead made many changes, and that even after the codes were adopted the
legislatures simply continued adding more crimes later).
265. Model Penal Code Conference Banquet Remarks and Responses, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 855,
864 (1988) (remarks of Herbert Wechsler).
266. Stuntz, supra note 33, at 583.
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opera having too many notes."267 The result, it is argued, is that we
are on the verge of "a world in which the law on the books makes
everyone a felon."2 6 8 Such a state of affairs is lamentable not just
because it exposes "ordinary people to criminal punishment for
innocuous behavior" but also because it "expands the discretion of
prosecutors to the point of lawlessness." That is because, with a
myriad of criminal prohibitions to select from, prosecutors can
"effectively pick and choose offenders as well as offenses."269
If the critics' first complaint is that legislative primacy has led
to a problem of overcriminalization, their second is that legislatures
are also guilty of overpunishment. That is to say, even where
lawmakers have properly proscribed a particular class of harmful
conduct, the penalties for such violations are too harsh. 27 0 As Professor
Luna describes it, the modern-day system features "grossly
disproportionate penalties that bear no relation to the wrongfulness of
the underlying crime" and results in "sentences that cannot contribute
to the traditional goals of punishment in any meaningful sense."27'
Critics contend that much of the problem owes to a lack of
individualization in American punishment regimes, due in particular
to the prevalence of mandatory minimum sentences. 272 Why such
individualization is desirable in judicial sentencing, but not in
prosecutorial charging, is something the critics may find it useful to
explain. It is no answer to say that sentencing and charging are
different settings when a degree of individualization would serve the
interests of justice in both instances.
If given their druthers, what would the critics have instead of
the current regime of alleged overcriminalization and
overpunishment? Why, fewer criminal laws and reduced punishments,
of course. But the critics contend that such changes are unlikely to
267. Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 713 (2005);
see also Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 223 (2007)
(noting the critique that the "process of criminal law legislation is, as several leading scholars
have characterized it, a 'one way ratchet.' "); Stuntz, supra note 33, at 509 (noting how criminal
law has become "a one-way ratchet that makes an ever larger slice of the population felons").
268. Stuntz, supra note 33, at 511.
269. Brown, supra note 267, at 223; see also supra Part II.C.
270. See Nancy J. King, Judicial Oversight of Negotiated Sentences in A World of Bargained
Punishment, 58 STAN. L. REV. 293, 301 (2005) (noting that 'legislative adjustments to federal
sentencing policy have been a one-way ratchet for twenty years"); Stuntz, supra note 33, at 510,
526 (discussing the trend in modern day politics towards harsher punishment).
271. Luna, supra note 267, at 716.
272. See, e.g., Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDozO L. REV. 1,
1 (2010) ("A mandatory minimum deprives judges of the flexibility to tailor punishment to the
particular facts of the case and can result in an unduly harsh sentence.").
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occur within the current regime because crime and punishment is the
product of democratic processes-and voters are unlikely to demand
more lenient policies. 273 Thus, to the critics, the reason that criminal
codes are "so broad" and "always getting broader" is a pernicious
combination of ordinary political forces (voters demand harsher
treatment of criminals and politicians find it easy to oblige) and
institutional political incentives (legislators and prosecutors see
mutually reinforcing benefits to passing more and harsher criminal
laws).274
The critics are thus confronted with something of a means-end
conundrum. To achieve their desired ends (decriminalization and
lesser punishment), they must change the means through which those
ends are thwarted (legislative primacy). Or to put it slightly
differently, the critics say we must "end legislators' monopoly on crime
definition" because in order to fix the law governing what is
punishable and how it is to be punished, there must first be a change
in the matter of who gets to decide those questions.275 Doing so, of
course, raises the question of who will have the power in lieu of
legislators, and here the critics are clear that the palatable
alternatives are the very two mentioned above: judges and
independent experts. 276 With respect to the judge-driven alternative,
Professor Stuntz suggests that "courts could create the judicial
equivalent of new criminal codes, and insulate them from legislative
override by pegging them to due process."277 And with respect to the
independent expert approach, the idea would be to delegate decisions
concerning criminalization to unelected experts and bureaucrats who
273. See Stuntz, supra note 33, at 509 (noting that voters typically "demand harsh
treatment of criminals; politicians respond with tougher sentences (overlapping crimes are one
way to make sentences harsher) and more criminal prohibitions'); see also Sara Sun Beale,
What's Law Got To Do with It? The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors
Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23, 44-51 (1997)
(describing the deeply held public fear of crime).
274. Stuntz, supra note 33, at 509-10.
275. Id. at 579.
276. See, e.g., id. at 582-98 (discussing the dual approaches to pursuing decriminalization
and improving sentencing leniency: judicial control and independent experts); Luna, supra note
267, at 729, 731 (characterizing the "potential solutions" to overcriminalization as either
"imposing the judiciary as a check on the political branches," or the "non-judicial'depoliticization'
of substantive criminal law . .. [by] shifting the authority to define crimes in the first instance
from lawmakers to non-political experts in criminal justice").
277. Stuntz, supra note 33, at 588.
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would be insulated from popular pressures to overproscribe and
overpunish.278
Notwithstanding the critics' arguments, I believe our present
approach of placing the ultimate authority over crime and punishment
in the hands of the people themselves is much the best one. To begin
with, what and how we choose to punish are questions that in some
way affect all citizens. Roughly three in ten Americans-some ninety
million in total-reported in one poll that either they or someone in
their household has been a victim of crime within the past year
alone.279 The crime rate, of course, rises and falls, but even in a down
period, the number of people affected remains substantial. It
accordingly makes sense to trust legislators to decide what should be
unlawful, because they are responsive to the public at large. Placing
those decisions in the hands of unelected judges or independent
experts, by contrast, could frustrate the legitimate desires and
concerns of the people because judges and experts are unlikely to be
afflicted by the same problems experienced by ordinary citizens.
Judges and independent experts, after all, do not often inhabit areas
where the effects of crime and punishment are continually present.s0
Elites cannot easily fathom the proper balance between liberty and
safety in areas where parents constantly fear their children will be
conscripted into a gang or consumed by a drug addiction.281
Moreover, even if the critics were to win the day and place
judges or experts in charge, there is no guarantee that this would
bring about the more lenient criminal law the critics desire. It would
instead raise the same questions about the proper scope of crime and
degree of punishment at a different level of recursion. Indeed, there is
a certain irony to the critics' call for a more judge- and expert-driven
model of crime and punishment, since many of the aspects of the
278. See id. at 580, 582-83 (discussing the possibility of curbing legislators' power by
depoliticizing criminal law).
279. Joseph Carroll, U.S. Crime Victimization Trends Flat, http://perma.cc/SDA5-EJ2D
(gallup.com, archived Mar. 12, 2014).
280. Of course, as many critics note, many of our legislators may not represent these high-
crime communities either. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969,
1998-2010 (2008). But inevitable weaknesses in the democratic process do not warrant the
wholesale replacement of our system with an even less democratic one run by unelected judges or
unaccountable experts.
281. See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86
GEO. L.J. 1153, 1182 (1998) ("The complicated interactions between law, norms, and liberty
should make judges humble. They can't legitimately infer, for example, that . . . gang-loitering
laws . . . restrict liberty just because they interfere with individual choices. For those
laws ... may in fact be constructing options that individuals value and wouldn't otherwise
have.").
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system that critics find most objectionable are themselves judge and
expert made. Judges, for example, are responsible for the supposedly
unduly demanding standard for a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, the application of harmless error doctrine, and recent
backtracking on Miranda rights. 282 And it was an independent body of
academics and judges on the U.S. Sentencing Commission who drafted
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that still other experts have
condemned as "arbitrary" and "too harsh."28 3 Replacing legislative
primacy and its reliance on the will of the people with an
unaccountable, elite-driven model may or may not lead to the critics'
desired more lenient system, but at least in the democratically driven
approach, the people will get the criminal law they have sought.
In their hurry to denounce our current system, the critics have
also ignored its salutary diversity. It is true that there has been a
significant expansion in the number of federal crimes in recent
decades, an expansion that has trespassed on the traditional role of
states. Why this is so remains open to debate. Perhaps members of
Congress wish to share the credit in the "war on crime." Perhaps
modern criminal enterprises boast more sophisticated techniques,
spreading over many states, creating a situation that calls for a
coordinated federal response. Nonetheless, because American criminal
law is still shaped to a significant extent by federalism, states and
localities possess the ability to tailor sanctions to their particular
needs and values. If a state finds that its laws are too onerous or its
punishments too expensive, its citizenry can respond accordingly
through the democratic process. Limited budgets often force states to
pay significant attention to the costs of incarceration. 284 This variety of
approaches to criminal law benefits not only local communities but our
national discourse as a whole. 2 8 5 Trying to craft a judicially or expert-
imposed one-size-fits-all criminal law has its drawbacks. Greater
national uniformity may have a certain fairness and evenhandedness
to commend it. That was certainly the impetus for the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. 286 But it is no guarantee of leniency or
282. See supra notes 13-15, 21-24, and accompanying text (explaining the Supreme Court's
alleged weakening of the rights available to criminal defendants).
283. Stuntz, supra note 33, at 586.
284. See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1276, 1300-12 (2005) (explaining the role of incarceration costs in shifting criminal justice
policies).
285. Bilionis, supra note 251, at 1304.
286. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363-67 (1989) (discussing the background
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
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correctness, as the Sentencing Guidelines themselves attest. As
Justice Black noted in this context, "experience in making local laws
by local people is by far the safest guide for a nation like ours to
follow." 287
The concept of democratic control over crime and punishment
is preferable to a system driven by judges or independent elites for yet
another important reason: legislative primacy is most consistent with
the Constitution. Although the Constitution does not expressly locate
the power to set criminal law in one branch or another, it does contain
a useful analog: the war and foreign policy powers. Article I vests in
Congress the power to "declare war,"288 and Article II is widely
understood to grant the President significant power with respect to
foreign policy. 289 That power over issues of external collective security
are placed in the hands of the democratically accountable branches
suggests that questions of internal collective security-that is,
questions of domestic crime and punishment-should also be open to
elective input.
There is, of course, an important difference between questions
of external and internal security: the latter are irrefutably subject to
the safeguards of the Bill of Rights. 290 Where the public's sense of
security against domestic criminals is protected by legislative
determinations regarding crime and punishment, the rights of
individual criminal defendants, whether state or federal, are protected
by the Constitution's many procedural guarantees. But this just
underscores the central point: To the extent the Constitution envisions
judicial involvement in crime and punishment, it views the judiciary
as a check on the processes of criminal investigation and adjudication,
not a check on the popular definitions of criminal law that commence
the adjudicatory process in the first place. 291
287. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 548 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
288. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
289. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § I, cl. 1 ('The executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States. . . ."); id. § II, cl. 1. ("The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States . . . ."). See generally Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D.
Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001) (examining the
scope of executive power over foreign affairs considered at various stages prior to and just after
the ratification of the Constitution).
290. Whether the Bill of Rights imposes limitations on Executive foreign policy powers is a
topic of some debate, as evidenced by a recent memo drafted by the Office of Legal Counsel in
relation to the United States' use of an unmanned drone to kill Anwar al-Awlaki, an American
citizen and active member of Al Qaeda. See Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case
to Kill a Citizen, http://perma.cc/9JZ-MKVB (nytimes.com, archived Mar. 12, 2014).
291. See generally Bilionis, supra note 251 (examining the role of the Constitution in
distinguishing procedural versus substantive criminal law).
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Other aspects of the Constitution support the view that
legislative primacy is the proper approach to defining crime and
punishment. The Supreme Court has long rejected the proposition
that federal judges might create a body of federal criminal common
law, using reasoning that implicates separation of powers principles.
In the 1812 case of United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, for example,
the Court refused to hold that federal courts possess common-law
jurisdiction to adjudicate criminal libel prosecutions because "[t]he
legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix
a punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction
of the offence." 292 More recently, in Whalen v. United States, the Court
declared that "within our federal constitutional framework the
legislative power, including the power to define criminal offenses and
to prescribe the punishments to be imposed upon those found guilty of
them, resides wholly with the Congress." 293
Relocating the power to define crime and punishment in the
judiciary would also present due process concerns. Unlike statutes,
which are prospective and worded in generally applicable terms,
judicial crime definition through ad hoc, case-by-case decisionmaking
may not provide sufficient notice to ordinary citizens on how to
comport with the law.294 Relatedly, to punish a person criminally for
failure to abide by an unclear common-law duty might lead to ex post
facto concerns, since a defendant might argue that none of the prior
precedents sufficiently proscribed the charged conduct and that a
conviction would thus amount to an unconstitutional, post hoc
criminalization. 295
Finally, the critics are wrong to demand the curtailment of
legislative primacy over criminal law because their very premise-
that democratically enacted criminal laws are a "one-way ratchet"
towards more and harsher punishment-is itself hugely
oversimplified. As Professor Darryl Brown has argued, "State
legislatures, in fact, have long and continuing records of repealing or
narrowing criminal statutes, reducing offense severity, and converting
low-level crimes to civil infractions. Even as criminal law has
expanded greatly in some directions, it has contracted-dramatically
so-in other spheres of activity."296 Professor Brown points to
292. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
293. 445 U.S. 684, 689 (1980).
294. Rosenberg, supra note 260, at 197.
295. Id. at 198.
296. Brown, supra note 267, at 225.
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consensual sex offenses, statutes criminalizing expressive conduct,
gaming regulation, concealed weapons statutes, intrafamily assault
and battery, and public drunkenness as examples of areas in which
legislatures have been responsible for the contraction of criminal
law.2 97 And even one of the foremost critics of the current system has
recognized that some states and jurisdictions are experimenting with
more lenient policies, such as imposing shorter jail sentences for
probation violations and the proactive use of injunctions to disrupt
gang activities rather than relying upon back-end criminal charges.298
Our democratically produced system of crime and punishment
is more lenient than the critics would admit for the additional reason
that it entails graduated schemes that punish in proportion to the
severity of a given offense. 299 This feature is hardly unique to a
democratic system of crime and punishment, but it is present. For
example, federal law punishes bank robberies that do not use force,
violence, or intimidation less severely than those that do, and
authorizes additional punishment where the crime is committed with
a dangerous weapon or results in a death.300 Similarly, the California
burglary statute discussed above identifies two distinct subclasses of
offense conduct and imposes less severe punishment (one year in
county jail as opposed to two, four, or six years in state prison) for less
culpable conduct (burglary of a structure other than a dwelling).301
Legislative primacy has also produced a graduated juvenile justice
system. That system encompasses a host of dispositions and
procedures, such as probation, parole, indeterminate sentences, and
the juvenile court itself, all of which reflect "open-ended, informal, and
highly flexible policies to rehabilitate the deviant."302 In addition to
focusing on rehabilitation, juvenile justice systems also employ
proportional sentencing structures based on a juvenile's present and
297. Id. at 235-43; see also Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the 'American Criminal Class'"
Why Congress (Sometimes) Protects the Rights of Defendants, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 613-14
(summarizing recent federal legislation protecting the seizure of a criminal defendant's assets,
restricting the investigative tactics of federal prosecutors, and giving defendants the ability to
recover legal fees spent defending against frivolous prosecutions).
298. STUNTZ, supra note 159, at 295.
299. See Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1687-88 (2009)
("Criminal law embodies proportionality in punishment schemes that impose milder sanctions
such as short or suspended sentences for lesser crimes, and harsher sanctions for graver
crimes.").
300. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (2012).
301. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 459-61 (West 2014).
302. Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment,
Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 823 (1988).
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prior offenses, so that punishment is meted out in relation to an
individual offender's circumstances. 303
In short, it is far too simple to declare that crime and
punishment in America are overly harsh and only getting harsher.
The Supreme Court captured the more nuanced reality when it
recognized in the Eighth Amendment context that, despite the "well-
known fact that anticrime legislation is far more popular than
legislation providing protections for persons guilty of violent crime,"
numerous state legislatures have nonetheless adopted more lenient
policies over time regarding certain controversial forms of punishment
such as capital punishment for the mentally retarded.304 That crime
and punishment is not a one-way street toward an inevitably more
draconian state makes sense because lawmakers face competing
incentives. Some voters may desire harsher punishments and broader
criminal proscriptions, but lawmakers must also respond to the reality
that locking up petty criminals consumes a great deal of resources
that may be more valuably spent serving other important social
functions.305
Faced with these countervailing public policy interests, the
notion that lawmakers are always out to put as many people in prison
as they can, and for as many years as possible, just does not pass
muster. I do not deny, of course, that legislatures can be tough,
mandatory minimum sentences being a prime example. While such
sentences may help to achieve the goal of equal punishment for those
who commit identical offenses, they do so at the sacrifice of the
individualization that ought also to be part of so personal a proceeding
as sentencing. But where long sentences are handed down, there is
often a good reason. Democratic government is not wrong in
understanding that the most serious crimes inflict profound personal
and social harms, and accordingly merit serious punishment, or that a
record of repeated offenses merits progressively stricter sanctions.
That the system responds to such popular concerns may build a sense
of trust in it and help ward off the spirit of helplessness that too often
seizes the victims of horrific crimes. To shift control of the system into
more elite and less accountable hands risks further widening the gulf
303. Id. at 822.
304. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002) (noting a steady and consistent direction of
change towards abolition of the death penalty for mentally retarded defendants).
305. See, e.g., Dan Morain, Changes Ahead for California's Prisons and 'Three Strikes' Law,
http://perma.cc/Z3HL-FL8N (modbee.com, archived Mar. 12, 2014) (noting that "the pendulum
has swung" and California lawmakers are now recommending paring down the state's harsh
Three Strikes law in order to reduce prison costs). See generally Barkow, supra note 284.
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between government and governed. Such a prospect should give critics
serious pause in their indictment of our system of democratic control
over crime and punishment. The Bill of Rights and many rules and
statutes safeguard precious personal liberties, but it is also the
people's country, and some measure of popular governance and public
safety leads to a liberty and opportunity all its own. To the extent the
criminal justice system values democratic input and legislative
primacy, that is a virtue.
B. Democratic Input Through the Criminal Jury
Apart from legislative control over crime and punishment, our
criminal justice system grants remarkable power to ordinary citizens
in the form of the jury. As De Tocqueville long ago understood, "The
institution of the jury . .. places the real direction of society in the
hands of the governed, .... and not in that of the government ... . [It]
invests the people, or that class of citizens, with the direction of
society."306 The importance of the jury's role in our criminal justice
system is underscored by the fact that the Constitution mentions it
three times, both in the main text and the Bill of Rights. 307 Taken
together with the civil jury, no other safeguard of freedom is discussed
more times in the Constitution.308 Ours is not a system run entirely by
juries, of course. Judges and attorneys play, as they should, a crucial
role, especially where complex legal questions are involved. We have
what can be called a mixed system, but one that, thanks to the role of
the criminal jury, has a gentle democratic tilt.
Surely the role that juries play in American criminal justice
deserves a paean or two, even from the system's most hardened critics.
Simply put, it is cause for celebration that the American system is as
democratic as it is. The criminal jury serves four important functions.
First, and perhaps most importantly, it protects the people from
306. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 293-94 (Philip Bradley ed., Vintage
Books 1945) (1835).
307. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ('The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall
be by jury . . . ."); U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or
public danger . . . ."); U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed. . . .").
308. Meghan J. Ryan, Juries and the Criminal Constitution 3 (S. Methodist Univ. Dedman
Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 121, 2012), available at http://perma.ccl6HP5-
H9N9.
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governmental abuse. Whether guarding against an overzealous
prosecutor or an underwhelming case, the criminal jury is a crucial
mechanism for protecting defendants. True autocrats would never
trust free juries but would opt for judges whose rulings could be
reliably engineered by the state. Jury nullification, the ultimate
expression of the jury's unreviewable power to acquit defendants, has
admittedly been the subject of abuse, as when white juries in the Jim
Crow South acquitted white defendants of crimes against black
victims even when their guilt was clear. 309 But the solution in such
cases is not to eliminate juries but rather to ensure that they are
representative. Thus, the Supreme Court has held that the Equal
Protection Clause forbids racial discrimination in jury composition.310
The ultimate juror power to acquit is a beautiful thing. It predates
even the Constitution. The celebrated case of John Peter Zenger, a
colonial-era newspaper publisher tried for seditious libel for his
outspoken criticism of New York Royal Governor William Cosby,3 11
illustrates the vital role the jury plays in checking government
tyranny. In acquitting Zenger despite the trial judge's ruling that
truth was not a defense to libel,312 the jury protected both Zenger's
liberty and colonial freedom of the press from royal tyranny.
The criminal jury safeguards liberty not only by checking
prosecutors, but also by tempering the power of judges, the
quintessential legal insiders. "[J]udges and lawyers, even the most
upright, able, and learned, are sometimes too much influenced by
technical rules; and ... those judges who are wholly or chiefly
occupied in the administration of criminal justice are apt . .. to decide
questions of law too unfavorably to the accused."313 By enabling a
cross-section of the community to apply generalized laws to an
individual defendant, the jury system allows each criminal case to be
seen with fresh eyes.314 Ultimately, by ensuring that an individual will
309. Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's Constitutional Role in an
Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 74 (2003).
310. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-88 (1986) (holding that racially discriminatory
uses of peremptory challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S.
587, 599 (1935) (holding that discriminating based on the false assumption that members of
defendant's race are not qualified to serve violates the Equal Protection Clause).
311. See generally JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN
PETER ZENGER (Stanley Katz ed., 1963).
312. See David A. Pepper, Nullifying History: Modern-Day Misuse of the Right to Decide the
Law, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 614-16 (2000) (recounting the Zenger defense attorney's
urging of the jury to reject the judge's view of the case law).
313. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 174 (1895) (Gray, J., dissenting).
314. Barkow, supra note 309, at 61-62.
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only be punished for conduct that his community, rather than a
faceless or faraway government bureaucracy, disapproves of, the
criminal jury injects the prospect of lenity into our criminal laws. In
the words of Learned Hand, the presence of the jury "introduces a
slack into the enforcement of law, tempering its rigor by the mollifying
influence of current ethical conventions."315
Some commentators accept in the abstract the capacity of the
jury to temper the harshness of the criminal law but nevertheless
believe the jury's role to be largely inconsequential in an age
dominated by plea bargaining.316 But this conclusion is too hasty. For
those who despair over the rise of plea bargaining, consider what
would happen if defendants did not possess a right to demand a jury
trial. The accused would lack the specter of a jury's scrutiny to ward
off an unjust prosecution. Like most deterrents, a panel of one's peers
need not be immediately present to do its job.3 17
The jury's second role in accurately finding facts has also
elicited the critics' skepticism. Commentators have highlighted the
mistakes that lay juries can make-for example, when evaluating
complex statistical evidence. 318 But such observations, even if true,319
do not militate in favor of shifting more fact-finding responsibility at
trial from juries to judges. In making factual determinations, a group
of jurors has qualities that a single judge does not: there are more of
them, and with their increased number comes greater diversity in
their backgrounds and the perspectives they bring to evaluating the
evidence at trial. Indeed, the jury itself reflects a mini-version of
democracy, in particular the idea of deliberative democracy: that
through reasoned debate and discussion, groups of citizens can come
to good decisions. 320 Scientific research tends to confirm this theory: in
315. United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 775-76 (2d Cir. 1942), rev'd on
other grounds, 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
316. See Barkow, supra note 309, at 34 ('Today, however, the jury's role as a check on the
government's power has become far more limited. The criminal process in the United States has
become largely an administrative one, with the police, prosecutors, and judges overseeing the
criminal laws with little intervention by the people.").
317. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
318. See generally William C. Thompson, Are Juries Competent to Evaluate Statistical
Evidence?, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1989) (noting potential for jurors to overestimate or
underestimate probabilistic values of evidence).
319. For a discussion of the challenges in judging juror competence, see Gregory Mitchell,
Asking the Right Questions About Judge and Jury Competence, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 519 (2005).
320. See Richard A. Primus, When Democracy Is Not Self-Government: Toward a Defense of
the Unanimity Rule for Criminal Juries, 18 CARDOzO L. REV. 1417, 1420, 1448-54 (1997)
(describing the deliberative process as one iteration of democracy in action).
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a wide variety of contexts, groups perform better than individuals in
making factual judgments and coming to sound conclusions. 321
The final two benefits of the criminal jury center less on the
individual trial than on our broader democratic system. By anchoring
convictions and punishment in the defendant's community, juries help
legitimize the criminal justice system.322 As the Supreme Court has
noted, "Community participation in the administration of the criminal
law ... is not only consistent with our democratic heritage but is also
critical to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice
system."323 And finally, by requiring ordinary citizens to engage in the
vital task of adjudicating the guilt or innocence of their peers, criminal
jury service educates citizens in their civic roles and responsibilities. 324
And yet, despite the jury's essential role, there exist constant
efforts on the part of critics to undermine its position. In Section II.A,
I noted the relentless pressures to displace the Constitution's
emphasis on a speedy and public trial by jury with repetitive
hindsight in the form of collateral review. There are efforts to restrict
the jury's role at the time of trial as well.
For example, judge-made rules that exclude highly probative
evidence from the eyes of jurors-rules that criminal justice reformers
continue to advocate 325-have a soft legal foundation. Although
legislatively created exclusionary rules also limit the jury's fact-
finding, they do not offend its democratic role because the rules
themselves are democratically generated. For example, the federal
321. See generally JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2004). For a discussion of
the implication of Surowiecki's conclusions on criminal juries, including suggested reforms, see
Josh Chafetz, Book Note, It's the Aggregation, Stupid!, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 577, 580-84
(2005) (reviewing SUROWIECKI, supra).
322. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, Jural Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries Through
Community Representation, 52 VAND. L. REV. 353, 361 (1999) (contending representativeness of
the jury enhances legitimacy); Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?-Rethinking Sixth
Amendment Doctrine, Images, and Procedures, 64 N.C. L. REV. 501, 504 (1986) (asserting that
jury composition affects community respect for the verdict).
323. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
324. Here too there is empirical support. For example, engaging in jury deliberations in a
criminal trial has been shown to increase voting rates. See JOHN GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND
DEMOCRACY 35-37 (2010).
325. For only a small sampling of recent defenses of judge-made exclusionary rules, see, for
example, Robert M. Bloom & David H. Fentin, "A More Majestic Conception" The Importance of
Judicial Integrity in Preserving the Exclusionary Rule, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 47 (2010); Orin S.
Kerr, Good Faith, New Law, and the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 99 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1078
(2011); Roger Roots, The Originalist Case for the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 45
GONZ. L. REV. 1 (2009); Scott E. Sundby, Everyman's Exclusionary Rule: The Exclusionary Rule
and the Rule of Law (or Why Conservatives Should Embrace the Exclusionary Rule), 10 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 393 (2013).
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"rape shield"326-which limits the admissibility of evidence of a sexual
assault victim's past sexual behavior, and which has been enacted in
some version in virtually all of the stateS327 -came out of a legislative
deliberation that balanced jurors' access to evidence and the
defendant's right to a full defense against invasion of the private life of
the victim. 32 8 Similarly, the baseline requirements of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, that evidence be relevant and not unfairly
prejudicial to the defendant, 329 represent a democratically achieved
consensus that judges play an important, although limited, screening
role in aiding the jury's fact-finding. On a more general level,
legislatures can reform evidentiary practices without mandating the
ultimate step of exclusion by, for example, directing improved conduct
and recordation of police lineups.
By contrast, judge-made exclusionary rules-particularly in
the form of implied constitutional remedies that do not have a clear
basis in that document's text-are doubly antidemocratic: they set
courts above legislatures as to rules of procedure by mandating the
application of certain forms of redress, and they diminish the role of
the jury. Although I do not advocate their abolition-they can be
appropriate in guarding against plainly unacceptable forms of
government abuse-they must be used cautiously and sparingly.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court has properly limited the scope of such
rules in the past few decades. These decisions have been broadly
criticized, but in fact they should be celebrated as striking a sensible
balance between procedural protections for defendants and the
accurate determination of innocence and guilt.
Judge-made exclusionary rules can be divided into two
categories according to their purpose. First, there are rules that are
motivated by a lack of faith in the jury to properly evaluate evidence.
As I discussed earlier, commentators have argued for, and some courts
have even agreed to, broad restrictions on the admissibility of
326. FED. R. EVID. 412.
327. Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual Consent
and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 81 (2002).
328. 124 CONG. REC. 34,913 (1978) (statement of Rep. Mann):
The bill before us [adopting Fed. R. Evid. 412] fairly balances the interests involved-
the rape victim's interest in protecting her private life from unwarranted public
exposure; the defendant's interest in being able adequately to present a defense by
offering relevant and probative evidence; and society's interest in a fair trial, one
where unduly prejudicial evidence is not permitted to becloud the issues before the
jury.
329. See FED. R. EVID. 402, 403.
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eyewitness testimony.330 Given the above discussion of the virtues of
criminal juries, we can see even more clearly why such a move is
misguided. Not only might it ultimately decrease the accuracy of
criminal verdicts-by taking fact-finding away from diverse juries and
giving it to singular judges-but it also impinges on the jury's
democratically grounded role as fact-finder. Nor are such broad,
judicially created rules of exclusion necessary. The Sixth Amendment
dictates confrontation rather than exclusion as the appropriate
approach to eyewitness testimony. The Confrontation Clause
augments the jury's role, and it is hardly up to judges to diminish it.
Of course, the Supreme Court recognized in Crawford v. Washington
that the Confrontation Clause excludes the out-of-court testimonial
statements of witnesses who do not testify at trial, unless that witness
is "unavailable" and the defendant "had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination." 331 As a general matter, however, eyewitness testimony
should not be subject to a judge's decision as to admissibility but
should instead go through the adversary process and be left to the
jury's determination of its value and weight.332
The exclusionary rules in the second category are those
motivated not by mistrust of the jury, but rather by mistrust of law
enforcement. For example, the Supreme Court has emphasized
multiple times that the sole justification for the Fourth Amendment's
exclusionary rule is its deterrent effect against police misconduct. 333
Similarly, the goal of deterring Fifth Amendment violations plays a
role in justifying the exclusion of evidence obtained through non-
Mirandized interrogations. 334
Although such deterrence is an important consideration, it
must be weighed against other values, including the democratic
prerogatives of juries in evaluating evidence and the accurate
determination of guilt and innocence. To exclude overbroadly in the
interest of deterrence leads criminal trials ever further from their
primary purpose: the ascertainment of the truth. Fortunately, the
330. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
331. 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004).
332. The Supreme Court has supported this principle, holding most eyewitness
identifications admissible under a "totality of the circumstances" test unless there is a
"substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98,
107-14 (1977).
333. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011); Herring v. United States,
555 U.S. 135, 141 & n.2 (2009); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984).
334. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974) (applying the deterrence rationale of
the exclusionary rule to the context of the Fifth Amendment and violations of the Miranda
rules).
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Supreme Court has recognized this all-important tradeoff and
declined to eviscerate the democratic pursuit of truth at trial at the
heart of the criminal justice system. For instance, in Hudson v.
Michigan,335 the Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply
to evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment's knock-
and-announce requirement for searches conducted pursuant to
warrants. 336 Testing the potential exclusion against its deterrent
effect, the Court concluded that exclusion would not advance the
purpose of the knock-and-announce rule: to protect inhabitants' safety
and private property interests. 337 The incentive to violate the knock-
and-announce rule is generally minor, and the rule may be suspended
when the police have a reasonable suspicion that the residents are
destroying evidence or are about to engage in violent resistance.338
Following a similar balancing approach, the Court held in
Davis v. United StateS339 that the exclusionary rule does not apply to
searches conducted in reasonable reliance on then-binding appellate
precedent. 340 Both Hudson and Davis have been subject to withering
criticism, 34 1 with some commentators engaging in overheated rhetoric
about the "end of the exclusionary rule."34 2 But these criticisms
underestimate the costs to accuracy of exclusion and exaggerate its
deterrent effects. Exclusion, especially of trustworthy evidence, makes
335. 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
336. Id. at 594.
337. Id. at 594-95.
338. See id. at 596 (examining the costs and benefits of deterring knock-and-announce
violations).
339. 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
340. Id. at 2428-29.
341. For criticisms of Hudson, see, for example, Mark E. Cammack, The Rise and Fall of the
Constitutional Exclusionary Rule in the United States, AM. J. COMP. L., Supp. 2010, at 631, 645
(stating that Hudson added a "new wrinkle" to the attenuation doctrine by recognizing
attenuation between the purposes served by the rule violated and the exclusion of evidence);
Thomas K. Clancy, The Irrelevancy of the Fourth Amendment in the Roberts Court, 85 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 191, 202 (2010) ("At its most fundamental level, Hudson called into question the future of
the exclusionary rule. . . ."). For criticisms of Davis, see, for example, George M. Dery III, "This
Bitter Pill"- The Supreme Court's Distaste for the Exclusionary Rule in Davis v. United States
Makes Evidence Suppression Impossible to Swallow, 23 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 1 (2012); Tracey
Macin & Jennifer Rader, No More Chipping Away: The Roberts Court Uses an Axe to Take Out
the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 81 MIss. L.J. 1183, 1189-91 (2012) (contending that
the Supreme Court's decision in Davis is cause for alarm); James J. Tomkovicz, Davis v. United
States: The Exclusion Revolution Continues, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 381, 382 (2011) (arguing that
Davis "confirms the advent of a new era of exclusionary rule development, reflecting the Roberts
Court's commitment to a revolutionary, and stifling, revision of the Fourth Amendment bar to
illegally obtained evidence").
342. David A. Moran, The End of the Exclusionary Rule, Among Other Things: The Roberts
Court Takes on the Fourth Amendment, 2006 CATo SUP. CT. REV. 283, 283.
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it more likely that juries will acquit guilty defendants. In addition to
harming society by letting criminals go free, exclusion also risks
undermining public confidence in our criminal justice system.343 And
because police frequently have law-enforcement incentives beyond an
eventual successful prosecution, the exclusionary rule's ability to alter
police behavior is often limited. 344
The Court's balancing approach has also properly tempered the
reach of the Fifth Amendment's exclusionary rule. Ever since Harris v.
New York, 345 evidence obtained from non-Mirandized interrogations
has been admissible to impeach a defendant's testimony.346 Harris
recognized that the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination was meant, among other things, to keep the government
from compelling defendants to testify against themselves in court,
rather than to prevent it from impeaching their willfully misleading
in-court statements. 347 I repeat that exclusionary rules have their
place. They ensure that trials are not contaminated by lawless
government misconduct. That too diminishes public trust in the
system. But the aggressive application of exclusions severs a trial
from external reality to an unacceptable extent. Exclusions hide truth,
rather than seeking to reveal it. That is not a comfortable place for a
trial, or any honest instrument of inquiry, to be.
Given my defense here and in Section II.A of the jury's critical
role in American criminal justice, it might seem that I am always in
favor of expanding its role and limiting that of judges. But the
democratic virtues of the criminal justice system are occasionally
themselves in tension. Alongside the place of the jury in our criminal
justice system are the claims of democracy. Thus, as with the
exclusionary provisions in the Federal Rules of Evidence, the jury's
fact-finding function may properly be subject to democratically
enacted limits. For this reason I am troubled by the Supreme Court's
decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey,348 which held that any fact, other
than a prior conviction, that could increase the maximum statutory
343. L. Timothy Perrin et al., If It's Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule: A
New and Extensive Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and a Call for a Civil
Administrative Remedy to Partially Replace the Rule, 83 IOwA L. REV. 669, 672 (1998).
344. See Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 585, 588-89 (2011) (noting that other incentives may include, for example, removing
weapons and drugs from the street).
345. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
346. Id. at 226.
347. See id. at 225 (recognizing that criminal defendants have the right to refuse to testify,
but having taken the stand they have an obligation to testify truthfully and accurately).
348. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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penalty must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.349
Apprendi and its line of cases350 increase the power of the jury, but do
so at the command of judges rather than legislatures. The Apprendi
doctrine baldly diminishes the primacy of the latter, which have
traditionally decided how to structure criminal procedure, including
choosing which facts about a crime were to be found by judges versus
by juries.351 To take from democratic bodies their historic power to
determine the elements of a crime and the accompanying sentencing
factors is a momentous step. Far from making criminal trials more
democratic, decisions like Apprendi are the legal equivalent of robbing
Peter (the legislature) to pay Paul (the jury).
C. Democratic Accountability in State Judiciaries
Another much-criticized aspect of our criminal justice system's
democratic tilt is the election of state-court judges. Denunciations are
almost universal and rain down from the highest echelons of the
American legal establishment. Since retiring from the bench, Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor has launched a campaign to persuade states to
abandon the direct elections of judges. 352 In a 2010 New York Times
op-ed, she stated that "elected judges are susceptible to influence by
political or ideological constituencies" and that, "[w]hen you enter one
of these courtrooms, the last thing you want to worry about is whether
the judge is more accountable to a campaign contributor or an
ideological group than to the law."35 3 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
also recently criticized the election of state judges: "I will be frank to
say that I think [elections are] a dreadful way to choose people for
judicial office."3 54 Legal commentators too have lined up to attack the
349. Id. at 490.
350. See, e.g., Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) (holding that any fact that
increases the mandatory minimum sentence for a crime is an element of the crime, not a
sentencing factor, and must be submitted to the jury).
351. See 530 U.S. at 564-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing how the Apprendi doctrine
"impedes legislative attempts to provide authoritative guidance as to how courts should respond
to the presence of traditional sentencing factors"); see also Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein,
Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1542 (2001) (arguing that the Apprendi doctrine
should be limited to "prohibit[ing] the worst legislative excesses, and this is as far as the Court
should intrude upon the supremacy of the legislature in defining substantive criminal law").
352. John Schwartz, Effort Begun to End Voting for Judges, http://perma.cclSEM2-DXGX
(nytimes.com, archived Mar. 12, 2014).
353. Sandra Day O'Connor, Take Justice off the Ballot, http://perma.cc/8HGC-948U
(nytimes.com, archived Mar. 12, 2014).
354. Jess Miller, Lawyers and Opera: Supreme Court Edition, http://perma.cc/4NW9-62MZ
(chqdaily.com, archived Mar. 12, 2014).
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practice of electing state-court judges, on grounds ranging from the
possibility of corruption to the lack of protection for minorities to
harsher sentences meted out to criminal defendants. 355 And high-
profile examples, like the recent Supreme Court decision holding that
a West Virginia Court of Appeals judge should have recused himself
because the president and CEO of a party corporation spent $3 million
dollars to aid the judge's campaign, provide much fodder for these
critics.356
These criticisms have force. Impartiality and its appearance in
our judicial system should be its bedrock characteristic. We expect
judges to maintain independence, not to be participants in the
contentious political battles so common to elections. For this reason,
campaign contributions in judicial elections can be more insidious
than contributions and expenditures in their legislative,
gubernatorial, and presidential analogues. But critics who advocate
ending the election of state-court judges altogether are throwing the
baby out with the bathwater. Their concerns argue for curbing the
worst excesses of judicial elections, like those on display in the Massey
Coal case, not discarding electoral systems altogether. Strict
campaign-finance laws in judicial elections ought to generate an
approving consensus. But no judicial elections anytime, anywhere? It
is a radical proposition, one at odds with a criminal justice system
that values its democratic features.
Given that federal judges are constitutionally appointed for
life, the presence of some elected state judiciaries introduces a healthy
diversity into the American judicial system. There is nothing in
natural law or the Constitution that makes the appointment of state
judges necessary and no policy imperative that requires state judges
to be unaccountable to the people. The diversity of mechanisms by
which states choose their judges-partisan elections to be sure, but
also nonpartisan elections, gubernatorial appointment followed by
355. See generally, e.g., Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of
Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L.
REV. 759 (1995); Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule
of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689 (1995); Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan
Price of Justice: An Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86
N.Y.U. L. REV. 69 (2011); Gerald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: Maintaining the
Independence of State Supreme Courts in an Era of Judicial Politicization, 72 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1133 (1997).
356. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
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uncontested retention elections, and lifetime appointment 357-should
be appreciated as an expression of the experimentalism and
decentralization that our federal system permits, rather than
condemned for not hewing to a particular, Article III-centric view of
judicial authority. Commentators have moved beyond their well-
founded concerns about judges too beholden to narrow, partisan, and
moneyed influence to maintain that elections by their very nature are
a key flaw in our system of justice.
The whole argument is a complicated one, touching civil as well
as criminal adjudications. Much, if not most, of the potential for
corruption or undue influence lies on the civil side. As to criminal
justice, it is far from clear that elected judges are "tougher on crime"
than are appointed judges, as critics maintain. As the current
examples of state decriminalization and deincarceration initiatives
demonstrate, 358 especially with regard to drug laws,359 state
electorates are fully capable of demanding that their elected officials-
and therefore presumably their elected judges too-ameliorate the
strictest features of the criminal law. Second, to the extent that
individual elected judges are "tougher on crime" than are their
appointed counterparts, 360 this merely begs the question of whether
the tough stance is right or wrong, or whether it is illegitimate for
judges to have some appreciation for the views and concerns of the
larger public. 361
Because crime and punishment affects so many Americans, so
should criminal law reflect popular, as well as elite, opinion, subject of
course to those restrictions and protections enshrined in the
357. See Am. BAR AsS'N, FACT SHEET ON JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS IN THE STATES
(2002), available at http://perma.cc/E3QL-2FG7 (examining the different methods by which
states choose their judges).
358. For example, in November, 2012, California voters approved a referendum relaxing the
notoriously harsh "three strikes" law. See Emily Bazelon, How California's Three-Strikes Law
Struck Out, http://perma.cc/CRM9-XS5U (slate.com, archived Mar. 12, 2014).
359. The proliferation of marijuana-decriminalization laws is a prime example of this trend.
See Steven B. Duke, The Future of Marijuana in the United States, 91 OR. L. REV. 1301, 1302
(2013).
360. See, e.g., Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Studying Courts Comparatively: The View
from the American States, 48 POL. RES. Q. 5, 24 (1995) ("[W]here judges must face voters to
retain their positions, state partisan competition exerts a positive influence on support for the
death penalty."); Gregory A. Huber & Stanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is
Justice Blind When It Runs for Office? 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 248 (2004) (finding that elected
Pennsylvania judges gave longer prison sentences for rape, robbery, and assault convictions the
closer the sentence was to the judges' reelections).
361. See David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 288
(2008) ("Beyond crime, other studies have found elected judges to be significantly more likely to
rule in ways that are consistent with public opinion and to favor in-state litigants.").
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Constitution. Democratic accountability may help to bridge the chasm
between the views of the elite precincts of judicial opinion and those of
the public that judges serve. This mechanism of self-government may
likewise help to legitimate judgments that otherwise might seem
inexplicable in their strictness or in their leniency. These points, while
surely open to debate, should serve at least to illustrate that the
question of elected state judiciaries has more than one side. How are
judicial elections structured? What laws exist to curb the worst
abuses? The critics of state judicial elections do not stop for such
nuance. They rush headlong into the sweeping proposition that this
democratic feature of American criminal justice has no redeeming
value. But the fact that some judges are appointed and others are
elected reflects a healthy ambivalence about judicial power. We want
our judges to be independent, detached, and nonpartisan to be sure,
but not so removed from the society of which judges are a part that
they have long since ceased to understand it.
V. CONCLUSION
My defense of American criminal justice has centered on two
elements. First, the system is engaged in tradeoffs that are not just
defensible, but necessary. We must balance liberty and order, and as
described above, the tradeoffs we have made manage that difficult
exercise in a manner that respects each of these fundamental values.
The second virtue of our system is that it includes a healthy measure
of democratic input. It maximizes democratic features-namely, the
role of the legislature in defining crimes and punishment, electorally
accountable prosecutors making charging decisions, and the jury in
determining guilt-within reason. Our system is best described as
mixed with a democratic lean, given its reliance both on these
democratic elements as well as the expertise of the judiciary and the
broader legal profession. This design derives its legitimacy by relying
heavily on democratic ideals, tempered sufficiently to ensure that
democracy promotes and does not trample personal liberty.
One final count in the indictment remains. Can we truly call a
system democratic when a very large section of the citizenry-African-
Americans-feel oppressed by or excluded from it? Is this a reason to
discredit American criminal justice? The reaction to the verdict in the
George Zimmerman trial in July 2013-in parts angry, reflective, and
resigned-reminded us that many African-Americans feel as though
the criminal justice system does not work for them. Washington Post
columnist Eugene Robinson argued, "Our society considers young
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black men to be dangerous, interchangeable, expendable, guilty until
proven innocent."362 Manhattan Institute scholar and New Republic
contributor John McWhorter argued that, for African-Americans, "the
poisonous relationship between young black men and law enforcement
is the prime manifestation of racism in modern America."363 And
President Obama noted that "the African American community is
looking at this issue through a set of experiences and history that
doesn't go away," one wrapped up in "a history of racial disparities in
the application of our criminal law."364
There is something to these criticisms. Americans have tried to
address them over the years by requiring objective, race-neutral
justifications for government actions within the criminal justice
system. We have, for example, required that the jury venire be
composed of a fair cross-section of the community,365 and in Batson v.
Kentucky, 366 the Supreme Court outlawed the use of peremptory
challenges of jurors based upon their race. We can insist that objective
criteria support stop and frisks. And we can focus on racial
discrepancies in criminal-law enforcement-which may lead, for
example, to four times as many marijuana arrests for black Americans
as white Americans, despite similar rates of use.3 67
But efforts such as these won't solve our problems altogether.
This is because the story is more complicated than simply a criminal
justice system that has failed to win the trust and confidence of many
in the African-American community. The problem of racial equality
and criminal justice is one of "painful complexity."368 We can
acknowledge that we have not yet reached our goal of race neutrality
in the dispensation of justice while acknowledging also that this alone
does not account for the racial makeup of our prisons and halfway
houses. Then-New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg stated, "Ninety
percent of all people killed in our city-and 90 percent of all those who
commit the murders and other violent crimes-are black and
362. Eugene Robinson, Black Boys Denied the Right To Be Young, http://perma.cc/T933-
UMG8 (washingtonpost.com, archived Mar. 12, 2014).
363. John McWhorter, No More "Conversations," http://perma.cc/GQX6-HUHB
(newrepublic.com, archived Mar. 12, 2014).
364. President Barack Obama, Remarks on the George Zimmerman Verdict (July 18, 2013)
(transcript available at http://perma.cc/8H3X-XE3K).
365. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
366. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
367. Ian Urbina, Blacks Are Singled Out for Marijuana Arrests, Federal Data Suggests,
http://perma.cc/6D7W-64YU (nytimes.com, archived Mar. 12, 2014).
368. Richard Cohen, Racism vs. Reality, http://perma.cc/8HD2-6MME (washingtonpost.com,
archived Mar. 12, 2014).
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Hispanic."369 That is the great double-edged sword. It understandably
leads to more stops and more arrests in high-crime areas. It
understandably leads to more convictions of those of whatever race
who commit the crimes. But it also leads to understandable anger and
resentment on the part of disadvantaged young black males who want
to make a decent go of American life, only to find themselves the
object of recurrent false suspicion and repeated frisks.
The solution to the problem of race and criminal justice is not a
total overhaul of the system. That just renders the criminal justice
system the scapegoat for a much larger set of social problems. The
criminal justice system feels the effects of those problems; it does not
cause them. Drug and gun crimes are not any less a blight upon
society because of the racial makeup of the offenders; indeed, as
Robinson noted, "[N]owhere will you find citizens more supportive
of tough law-and-order policies than in poor, high-crime
neighborhoods." 370 Our criminal justice system rightly aims to reduce
dangerous behavior, and the beneficiaries of success in that endeavor
may be those less advantaged citizens for whom basic safety will make
for greater opportunity, not to mention better prospects for a brighter
life.
To cast ceaseless blame on America's criminal justice system is
to ignore the enormity of the problems it has been asked to solve. It
only diverts attention from the larger ways in which America has
failed its underclass. As Michael Gerson recently noted, "The problem
of African American boys and young men is a complex mix of lingering
racial prejudice, urban economic dislocation, collapsing family
structure, failing schools and sick, atomized communities." 37 1 To
chastise criminal justice when many levers of upward mobility are so
compromised is an inversion of priorities. A complete "fix" of what the
critics allege ails criminal justice will do nothing to restore shattered
family structures, improve failing schools, impart necessary job skills,
restore religious and community support groups, or provide
meaningful alternatives in deprived neighborhoods to the gangs and
drug rings that steer young people toward lifelong addictions and lives
of crime. Society doesn't create opportunity by sacrificing the basic
social need for order. To the contrary, improvements in communities
369. Michael R. Bloomberg, 'Stop and Frisk' is Not Racial Profiling, WASH. POST, Aug. 19,
2013, at A19.
370. Eugene Robinson, Obama's Race Challenge-and Ours, http://perma.cc/M8PR-297Y
(washingtonpost.com, archived Mar. 12, 2014).
371. Michael Gerson, Obama's Race Speech Offered Few Good Solutions,
http://perma.cc/6T7G-PG8J (washingtonpost.com, archived Mar. 12, 2014).
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and institutions will only take root in the kind of safe environment
that, at its best, a strong criminal justice system can provide. And
when we provide opportunity, we in turn reduce the pressure on the
criminal justice system and lessen the monumental task that lack of
opportunity for the poorest Americans has left it to perform.
How a society chooses to balance justice and safety with rights
and liberties will invariably be the subject of vigorous debate. Our
criminal justice system is no exception. Many good and intelligent
people will disagree passionately about the contours of our criminal
law. That is all to the good. We should not grow complacent in the face
of particular problems, both for the sake of individual defendants and
for the rule of law itself.
But instead of engaging in a constructive debate about the
American approach to criminal justice, legal elites largely have
condemned the entire enterprise. The system, we are told, is broken,
and only sweeping reforms imposed from on high can save it. But the
rhetoric that fuels the wholesale assault upon the system not only will
fail to achieve any meaningful change, it obscures the many strengths
of our institutions. By focusing so much on what is wrong, we
inevitably forget what is right.
The terms of engagement must change. My call is not for
scholars to whitewash our system's failings but to realize the picture
is far more nuanced and complex than they have presented it. Given
the volume of matters it is asked to address and immensity of the task
it is asked to perform, our criminal justice system functions rather
well. It is both unrealistic and uncharitable to portray the system as
an engine of oppression and injustice. Ironically, many of the features
that critics claim operate one-sidedly against defendants often work to
their benefit. The American criminal justice system strikes a valuable
front-end note. It strikes difficult balances between protecting the
innocent and convicting the guilty, between procedural protections
and administrative realities. It rightly allows these contestable choices
to be made democratically, but only to a point. Such qualities are
hardly the hallmarks of a failed system.
Indeed, those who have been among the most persistent critics
of the criminal justice system were among the first to call for its
utilization in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks.372
372. See, e.g., David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights
as Citizens?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367, 378 (2003) (arguing that noncitizens should be given
the same constitutional due process protections as citizens because, inter alia, the "national
security interests implicated by the prosecution of Zacarias Moussaoui, indicted as the so-called
'twentieth hijacker,' would not be different were he a citizen").
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And since that time, the refrain has often been that acts of terrorism
are crimes that should be dealt with in the customary way through
enforcement of federal criminal law. 3 7 3 I recognize that this plea for
criminal trials does not constitute an acknowledgment of the system's
perfection, but it does indicate that the system imparts a legitimacy
for the deprivation of liberty that other routes of trying suspected
terrorists may lack. This is no place to explore the complicated
question of whether alleged terrorism is more aptly regarded as a
criminal offense or as an act of war. Separation of powers concerns
and the need for action to prevent mass casualties make the question
an exceptionally complicated one. I note only the irony that many who
reject the considerable virtues of the American criminal justice system
are at least prepared to look upon it as a preferred solution when the
values of liberty and security are in epochal tension.
To be sure, there is plenty of room for reform, and all parts of
the legal profession should head for the front lines. But let us not
forget our system's virtues as we seek to correct its vices. Otherwise,
any legitimate concerns will be lost in the din of diatribe. We have
gone too long without a degree of balance or moderation in our
assessment of the American criminal justice system. It is time we gave
our institutions a fair trial.
373. See, e.g., David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on
Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2003) (arguing that, since September 11th, "our
government has adopted both substantive and procedural shortcuts" to avoid the "criminal
process, with its rights to counsel, confrontation of adverse witnesses, public trial, and the
presumption of innocence," and that this approach is "replaying the mistakes of the past").
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